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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

BRIAN M. BARNARD,
;

Case No. 92-0259

Plaintiff/Appellant
BRIEF OF APPELLANT

vs.
ANN L. WASSERMANN,
SHIRLEY RANDAZZO,
and
THE HON. MICHAEL MURPHY,
Judge of the Third District
Court in and for Salt Lake
County, State of Utah,

i
J
:
:

Priority # 16

Defendants/Appellants.

PLAINTIFF and APPELLANT, BRIAN M. BARNARD, by and
through counsel, pursuant to the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure, submits the following BRIEF OF APPELLANT in
support his appeal in the above matter.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction in this court is based upon Ut. Code Ann.
§ 78-2-2 (3)(j) (1953 as amended).
This appeal is from an order of April 5, 1991
dismissing this action as against the defendant The Hon.
Michael Murphy, (T.R. p. 345; EXHIBIT "BB" attached) and
from an order of April 28, 1992 dismissing this action as

1

against defendant Shirley RandazzOc

T.R. p. 410; EXHIBIT

"CC" attached.
Notice of appeal was timely filed on May 6, 1992.

T.R.

p. 413; EXHIBIT "DD" attached.

NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
The Hon. Michael Murphy, defendant/appellee imposed
sanctions against the plaintiff/appellant, holding plaintiff
in contempt of court for plaintiffgs alleged failure to
properly represent a client, Frank Randazzo.

Defendant

Murphy did so in a divorce action before him, based upon
unsworn comments made by Frank Randazzo, without giving
plaintiff notice nor a pre-deprivation hearing.

Defendant

Murphy did so after plaintiff had withdrawn as counsel for
Frank Randazzo.
The sanctions imposed were that plaintiff was to
forfeit certain attorney fees owed by Frank Randazzo to
plaintiff.

Those funds were to be paid to Shirley Eiandazzo,

the former spouse of Frank Randazzo, for the use and benefit
of her counsel, Ann Wassermann.

The order of sanctions

against plaintiff implicated his good name and reputation.
Plaintiff sued seeking declaratory and other relief as
a collateral attack against the decision of defendant
Murphy, on the basis, inter alia, that Judge Murphy lacked
jurisdiction to impose sanctions against plaintiff.
2

The trial court herein, the Hon. Pat Brian dismissed
plaintiff's complaint as against both defendants for failure
to state a cause of action, res judicata, judicial immunity
and waiver.

The third named defendant Ann L. Wassermann,

was not a party to the proceedings below, although she
appears as counsel for the defendant Randazzo.

ISSUES ON APPEAL
1.

Did defendant Judge Michael Murphy have subject

matter jurisdiction to impose sanctions and hold Barnard in
contempt of court in Randazzo v. Randazzo?
2.

Did defendant Judge Murphy have personal

jurisdiction to impose sanctions and hold plaintiff in
contempt of court in Randazzo v. Randazzo?
3.

Did the imposition of sanctions in Randazzo v.

Randazzo by defendant Judge Murphy deny Barnard due process
of law?
4.

Were there any facts (much less sufficient "clear

and convincing" evidence) presented to defendant Judge
Murphy to warrant a finding of contempt and/or the
imposition of sanctions against Barnard?
5.

Did defendant Judge Murphy comply with the

necessary statutory provisions and did he find appropriate
facts to hold plaintiff in contempt and to impose sanctions?

3

6.

Is plaintiff's action barred by the doctrine of

judicial immunity?
7.

Is plaintiff's action barred by the doctrine of

waiver, or by some act of plaintiff in waiver?
8.

Is plaintiff's action barred by the doctrine of res

judicata?

STANDARD OF REVIEW
The standard of review by this Court is a full review
as a matter of law because all of the rulings of the court
below were pure matters of law.
The complaint as against Judge Murphy was dismissed on
three (3) legal theories —
judicial immunity.

res judicata, waiver and

Through findings, the trial court

provided some explanation as to the basis of this ruling.
Exhibit "BB" attached.
The complaint as against Shirley Randazzo was dismissed
for failure to state a cause of action.

The trial court

gives no indication (no findings were made) as to th€» nature
of the complaint's defects.

Exhibit "CC" attached.

When reviewing a dismissal under Rule 12 (b)(6),
Ut.R.Civ.Pro. this court assumes all facts well plead in the
complaint are true and indulges all inferences in favor of
the party opposing the motion.

(In addition, plaintiff

submitted an Affidavit verifying all of the facts set out in
4

his complaint.

Aff. of Plaintiff, dated November 6, 1990,

T.R. p. 169).
DISPOSITIVE PROVISIONS
United States Constitution, 14th amendment.
Utah Constitution, Art. I, § 7.
Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended)
§
§
§
§
§§

78-7-5
78-7-17
78-7-18
78-7-24
78-32-1 et seq

RELATED PROCEEDING BEFORE THIS COURT
Plaintiff herein filed a Petition for Extraordinary
Writ against the trial court judge assigned to this case,
the Hon. Pat Brian with this Court.
Supreme Court Case No. 91-0040.

Barnard v. Brian. Utah

That action was filed for

an immediate review by this Court of an order entered by
Judge Brian referring this case to the Hon. Michael Murphy,
to determine whether Judge Murphy had the jurisdiction to
impose upon Barnard the sanctions challenged herein.
Because such a referral would defeat the collateral review
sought herein and because such a referral for a decision by
a party defendant would be a denial of due process,
extraordinary relief was granted by this court, ordering the
Hon. Pat Brian to hear this matter and nullifying the order
of referral.
5

RELATED PROCEEDING BEFORE ANOTHER COURT
Plaintiff filed a similar action with similar
allegations against the same defendants in the United States
District Court for the District of Utah, Case No. 89-C-1042B# Barnard vs. Murphy, et al.

That action was dismissed for

lack of subject matter jurisdiction by the Hon. Clarence
Brimmer, by an order of May 4, 1990. A copy of that Order
of Dismissal is attached hereto as Exhibit "EEfl.
Brimmer made no ruling on the merits of the case.

Judge
Id.

Shortly after that federal action was dismissed for
lack of jurisdiction, plaintiff filed this action on May 31,
1990.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

This civil action seeks declaratory and injunctive

relief to redress a deprivation of property and liberty in
violation of the constitution and laws of the United States.
Plaintiff seeks declaratory relief that an order of the
Third Judicial District Court entered without jurisdiction
by the Hon. Michael Murphy for the benefit of the other
defendants is invalid, null and void.

Plaintiff seeks

attorney fees and court costs 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and §1988.
(Complt. 5 1; T.R. p. 2; Exhibit "AA" attached) (The
complaint was verified by plaintiff's affidavit dated
November 6, 1990; T.R. p. 169.)
6

2.

Jurisdiction below was based on Ut. Code Ann. § 78-

3-4 (1953 as amended).

(Complt. 5 2; Murphy Ans. 5 2, T.R.

P- 30)
3.

All of the conduct complained of occurred in Salt

Lake County, Utah.

(Complt. 5 3; Murphy Ans. 5 3; Randazzo

Ans. 5 3, T.R. p. 38)
4.

Plaintiff is an attorney admitted to practice

before the Courts of the State of Utah.

(Complt. 5 4;

Murphy Ans* 5 4, Randazzo Ans. 5 4; Plaintiffs Aff. 5 1.
ToR. p. 169)
5.

Ann Wassermann is an attorney admitted to practice

before the Courts of the State of Utah.

(Complt. 5 5;

Murphy Ans. 5 5; Randazzo Ans. 5 5)
6.

Shirley Randazzo is an adult citizen and resident

of Salt Lake County, Utah.

(Complt. 5 6; Murphy Ans. 5 6;

Randazzo Ans. 5 6)
7.

Frank Randazzo is an adult citizen and resident of

Salt Lake County, Utah.
action.
8.

He is not a defendant in this

(Complt. 5 7; Murphy Ans. 5 7)
Defendant Michael Murphy is a judge of the Third

Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State
of Utah.
9.

(Complt. 5 8; Murphy Ans. 5; Randazzo Ans. 5 8)
Plaintiff formerly represented Mr. Randazzo in a

divorce in the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt
Lake County, State of Utah (Case No. 88-490-4130 DA)
7

captioned Shirley Randazzo vs. Frank Randazzo.

(Complt. 5

9; Murphy Ans. I 9; Randazzo Ans. 5 9)
10.

That divorce action was tried to the Hon* Michael

Murphy on August 1, 1989.

Ann Wassermann represented

Shirley Randazzo in that action.

(Complt. 5 10; Murphy Ans.

5 10; Randazzo Ans. 5 10)
11.

After the trial and prior to September 13, 1989,

plaintiff withdrew as counsel for Mr. Randazzo and gave
notice of that withdrawal to the Third District Court, to
Mr. Randazzo and to Ann Wassermann.

(Complt. f 11; Murphy

Ans. 5 11, Randazzo Ans. I 11; Plaintiff's Aff. f 4)
12.

After the trial and before Findings of Fact,

Conclusions of Law and a Decree of Divorce were entered, Mr.
Randazzo allegedly failed to comply with the terms of the
court's ruling.
13.

At the request of Shirley Randazzo and counsel,

the trial court issued an Order to Show Cause requiring Mr.
Randazzo to appear before Judge Murphy on September 13, 1989
to show cause why he should not be held in contempt of court
for failure to comply with the Court's rulings.
14.

On September 13, 1989 a hearing was held in said

divorce action before Judge Murphy.

Plaintiff was not

present; present were defendants Murphy and Randazzo along
with Ann Wassermann and Mr. Randazzo.

The hearing was to

consider alleged contempt by Mr. Randazzo for failure to
8

comply with the court's rulings.

(Complt. f 12; Murphy Ans.

5 12; Randazzo Ans. 5 12)
15.

At said hearing, Mr. Randazzo made certain

representations to the Court regarding plaintiff's
representation of Mr. Randazzo.
NOT under oath.

Those representations were

Those representations were false,

incomplete and/or misleading.

Mr. Randazzo, made represent-

ations to Judge Murphy as to what plaintiff, his former
counsel, did or did not do in representing Mr. Randazzo.
(Complt. 5 13; Aff. of Plaintiff; Exhibit # 1 to Murphy's
Summary Judgment Memorandum, Transcript of September 13,
1989 hearing —
16.

T.R. p. 46; Randazzo Ans. 5 13)

A copy of the transcript of the hearing of

September 13, 1989 in Randazzo is an Exhibit in this action.
Exhibit # 1 to Murphy's Summary Judgment Memorandum —

T.R.

p. 46.
17.

At the hearing of September 13, 1989, the

defendant Murphy, sua sponte made an oral ruling that the
plaintiff had acted improperly in his representation of Mr.
Randazzo.

Based upon the unsworn comments of Mr. Randazzo,

Judge Murphy imposed sanctions against plaintiff and found
plaintiff in contempt of court for his alleged failure to
properly represent Mr. Randazzo and for his alleged failure
to notify Mr. Randazzo as to the Court's prior rulings.
Judge Murphy fined plaintiff by depriving him of a debt owed
9

by Mr. Randazzo.

The defendant Murphy ruled that Mr.

Randazzo should not pay to plaintiff the sum of $430.00
(Four Hundred Thirty Dollars) a portion of fees incurred in
plaintiff's representation of Mr. Randazzo.

Xnstecid, Mr.

Randazzo was ordered to pay that amount to Shirley Randazzo
and Ann Wassermann as and for attorney fees and costs
incurred by Shirley Randazzo.

(Complt. I 14; Murphy Ans. 5

14; Transcript of September 13, 1989 hearing, Exhibit #1 to
Murphy's Summary Judgment Memorandum; Order, Exhibit "O" to
Complaint Exhibit "AA" attached; Plaintiff's Aff. 5 5;
Randazzo Ans. 5 14)
18.

Plaintiff was not given notice that the hearing of

September 13, 1989 would consider any alleged mis-conduct of
plaintiff.

Plaintiff was not given notice that said hearing

would consider imposition of any sanction against plaintiff.
(Complt. 5 15; Plaintiff's Aff. 1 6)
19.

Plaintiff was not requested to be present at said

hearing and was not given an opportunity to be heard at said
hearing.

Plaintiff was never requested to respond to Mr.

Randazzo's allegations against him.

(Complt. 5 16;

Plaintiff's Aff. 5 6)
20.

After said hearing, Ann Wassermann prepared a

proposed order embodying the oral decision of the Court.
copy of that proposed order is attached to plaintiff's
Complaint (Exhibit "AA" attached) as Exhibit "0".
10

Ann

A

Wassermann mailed a copy of the proposed order to plaintiff
on September 15, 1989.

(Complt. 5 17; Randazzo Ans. 5 17;

Murphy Ans. 5 17)
21•

Said oral ruling and the proposed order deprive

plaintiff of property.

(Complt. fl 18; Randazzo Ans. 5 18;

Transcript of September 13, 1989 Hearing, Exhibit # 1 to
Murphy/s Summary Judgment Memorandum; Order, Exhibit "0" to
Complaint)
22.

Said oral ruling and the proposed order harm the

plaintiff's good name and reputation in the findings therein
to the effect that plaintiff acted improperly in his
representation of Mr. Randazzo.

(Complt. 5 19; Murphy Ans.

I 6; Transcript of September 13, 1989 Hearing, Exhibit # 1
to Murphy's Summary Judgment Memorandum; Order, Exhibit "0"
to Complaint)
23.

In response to receipt of said proposed Order

plaintiff filed an Objection on or about September 18, 1989.
Attached to plaintiff's Complaint
"B".

(Exhibit "AA") as Exhibit

(Complt. 5 20; Murphy Ans. 5 20; Randazzo Ans. f 20;

Plaintiff's Aff. J 7)
24.

In response to receipt of said proposed order,

plaintiff filed an Affidavit on or about September 18, 1989.
Attached to plaintiff's Complaint (Exhibit "AA") as Exhibit
"A".

(Complt. ? 21; Murphy Ans. 5 21; Randazzo Ans. 5 21;

Plaintiff's Aff. f 7)
11

25.

On September 20, 1989, plaintiff requested a

hearing before defendant Murphy to consider plaintiffs
Objection.

Exhibit "R" attached to plaintiff's Complaint

(Exhibit "AA").

(Murphy Ans. 5 22; Plaintiff's Aff. 5 7 ) .

No hearing was ever held in response to that request.
(Murphy Ans. 5 22; Complt. I 22)
26.

On October 4, 1989 plaintiff inquired of defendant

Murphy as to the status of the proposed order and the
plaintiff's Objection thereto.

Letter of October 4, 1989

attached hereto as Exhibit "FF".

Plaintiff received no

response to that letter.
27.

Without any further notice to plaintiff, Judge

Murphy signed the written order of sanctions against
plaintiff on October 12, 1989.
28.

(Plaintiff's Aff. 5 8)

Plaintiff never consented to jurisdiction over

plaintiff of Judge Murphy or the Third District Court to
enter the order of sanctions.

Plaintiff never waived the

lack of jurisdiction of the Third District Court and Judge
Murphy over plaintiff to enter an order of sanctions.
Plaintiff protested that Judge Murphy was denying plaintiff
due process of law and lacked jurisdiction over plaintiff to
enter an order affecting plaintiff's rights and imposing
sanctions without notice, etc.

12

(Plaintiff's Aff. f 9)

29.

Plaintiff never withdrew his objection and

affidavit in opposition (September 18, 1989) to the proposed
order of sanctions.
30.

(Plaintiff's Aff. 1 10)

Before October 12, 1989, plaintiff was not

afforded or offered any hearing on his objection to the
proposed order of sanctions.
31.

(Plaintiff's Aff. 5 11)

After October 12, 1989, plaintiff was informed by

Judge Murphy's clerk that the order of sanctions had been
signed and that plaintiff could request that Judge Murphy
set aside the order of sanctions.

The clerk said that

plaintiff could have a hearing to argue that Judge Murphy
should set aside the order.

The clerk told plaintiff in the

alternative, that if Ms. Wassermann agreed, an amended order
could be signed.
32.

(Plaintiff's Aff. 5 12)

No explanation has been offered why Judge Murphy

on October 12, 1989 over plaintiff's objection and without
any hearing, signed the order of sanctions.

(Plaintiff's

Aff. 5 13)
33.

Since Judge Murphy on October 12, 1989 had signed

the order of sanctions, on November 14, 1989, plaintiff
informed Judge Murphy's clerk that oral argument to set
aside the signed order was not necessary (plaintiff never
made such a motion).
34.

(Plaintiff's Aff. 5 14)

Plaintiff had requested a hearing on plaintiff's

objection before the order of sanctions was signed.
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Plaintiff did not make a motion to set aside the order of
sanctions after it was signed.
35.

(Plaintiff's Affe f 15)

Without further hearing, defendant Murphy on

November 14, 1989 entered the Order of sanctions. (Complt. 5
23; Plaintiffs Aff. f 8; Murphy Ans. J 23)
36.
record.
37.

The order of sanctions is a matter of public
(Complt. 5 23)
When defendant Murphy signed that order on October

12, 1989 he was aware that plaintiff had filed an objection
and Judge Murphy knew the basis of the objection.
(Plaintiff's Aff. 5 8; Complt. 5 23; Exhibit "FF" cittached)
38

Plaintiff had no right to a hearing on his

objection.

Under the procedures of the District Courts of

Utah then in effect the Courts were to consider and rule on
motions and objections without hearing.

Rule 4-501, Code of

Judicial Administration, Operations of the Courts (1988).
Under said rules, counsel could only request a hearing; only
the court, in its discretion, could authorize such hearings
and only on dispositive motions.
39.

Id.

Because this action affects the rights of Shirley

Randazzo she is an indispensable party.
40.

(Complt. f 27)

Plaintiff is not a party to the underlying divorce

action between Shirley Randazzo and Mr. Randazzo.

He is no

longer attorney for Mr. Randazzo and was not counsel of
record when the offending Order was entered.
14

(Complt. 5 29)

41.

The actions of defendant Murphy were taken under

color of state law and under the power granted to him as a
Judge of the District Court of the State of Utah.

(Complt.

5 30)
42.

Plaintiff seeks no damages in this action.

(Complt.)
43.

Plaintiff has incurred attorney fees and costs in

the pursuit of this matter and seeks to recover such fees
and costs under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.

(Complt. f 40)

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT AND
JUDGE MURPHY HAD NO
SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION
TO IMPOSE SANCTIONS UPON PLAINTIFF
The powers of a Utah district court are established by
statute.

Ut. Code Ann. § 78-7-5, § 78-7-17 and § 78-7-24

(1953 as amended).

Those powers do not include the power to

punish an attorney for a ethical violation of the Rules of
Professional Conduct of the Utah State Bar.
Assuming, for the sake of argument, as determined by
Judge Murphy, that the plaintiff herein:
(a)

Did not give Mr. Randazzo timely notice of the

details of the court's decision as announced in Mr.
Randazzo's absence on August 2, 1989; and,
15

(b)

Did not forward to Mr* Randazzo copies of the

proposed Findings of Fact and Decree of Divorce;
those errors are ethical violations.

Failure to provide

notice or forward proposed pleadings as alleged must be
dealt with by a proceeding before the ethics committee of
the Utah State Bar.1

Utah Constitution Art. VIII, § 4;

Rules for Integration & Management of the Utah State Bar, §
(c) 12.
District court judges have the power to enforce his/her
own orders, maintain decorum in the court room, etc.

(Ut.

Code Ann. § 78-7-5, § 78-7-17 and § 78-7-24 (1953 as
amended)), but a judge does not have the power to enforce
ethical rules of the Utah State Bar.

Such enforcement is

preempted by the State Bar and the Utah Supreme Court.

Utah

Constitution Art. VIII, § 4; Rules for Integration &
Management of the Utah State Bar, § (c) 12.
Because the alleged mis-conduct of the plaintiff fell
outside the specific statutory grant of power to a district
court, (Ut. Code Ann. § 78-7-5, § 78-7-17 and § 78-7-24
1
Noting the alleged mis-conduct of plaintiff herein,
the applicable provisions of the Rules of Professional
Conduct of the Utah State Bar would be: Rule 1.3 (A lawyer
shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in
representing a client.), Rule 1.4 (a) (A lawyer shall keep a
client reasonably informed about the status of a matter and
promptly comply with reasonable requests for information.)
and, Rule 1.4 (b) (A lawyer shall explain a matter to the
extent reasonably necessary to enable the client to make
informed decisions regarding the representation.)
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(1953 as amended)), and outside the contempt powers granted
to a district court, (Ut. Code Ann. § 78-7-18, §§ 78-32-1 et
seq (1953 as amended)), Judge Murphy was without subject
matter jurisdiction to impose sanctions.

POINT II
THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT AND
JUDGE MURPHY HAD NO PERSONAL JURISDICTION
TO IMPOSE SANCTIONS UPON PLAINTIFF
The district court and defendant Murphy lacked personal
jurisdiction to impose sanctions upon plaintiff.

Plaintiff

was not "before the Court" when on September 13, 1989,
defendant Murphy ruled and imposed sanctions.
Judge Murphy has never set forth the basis for
jurisdiction over plaintiff and plaintiff's alleged misconduct such that Murphy could impose sanctions and rule
that plaintiff failed to properly represent his former
client.2

Judges do not have the power to willy-nilly punish

people that have not properly represented clients.

There is

no inherent power of a judge to make counsel act in a
certain way outside the courtroom; the power of a court to
control an attorney is based upon statutory provisions.

For

a court to punish an attorney for a failure to act there
2

Interestingly, defendants in this action refused to
respond to discovery inquiring as to the basis of
jurisdiction for Judge Murphy's actions.
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must be a specific grant of power.

Punishment may be

imposed only when power and jurisdiction are granted, and
personal jurisdiction invoked and the party properly brought
before the court.
The only possible claim of subject matter or personal
jurisdiction by defendant Murphy over the plaintiff is that
of contempt of court.
as amended).

Ut. Code Ann. §§ 78-32-1 et seq (1953

Otherwise, defendant Murphy has no power to

regulate plaintiff's conduct.

A district court judcje has no

power to punish counsel for an alleged breach of the* canons
of ethics.

See supra.

A district court judge is granted

power to punish persons for contempt of court only for
specific reasons and in the specific manner provided by law.
Ut. Code Ann. § 78-7-18; §§ 78-32-1 et seq (1953 as
amended).
Only if contempt is committed in the immediate presence
of the judge may the (direct) contempt be punished
summarily.

Ut. Code Ann. § 78-32-3 (1953 as amended).

The

alleged mis-conduct of plaintiff occurred outside the
presence of defendant Murphy.

If the contempt (indirect) is

not committed in the immediate presence of the judge, "an
affidavit shall be presented to the court or judge of the
facts constituting the contempt, or a statement of facts.
o"

Id.

Based thereupon an order to show cause may issue,

which, when served brings the accused under the personal
18

jurisdiction of the Court,

Ut. Code Ann. § 78-32-4 (1953 as

amended)•
Absent the required initiatory affidavit or statement
of facts, (Ut. Code Ann. § 78-32-3 (1953 as amended)) a
court lacks the jurisdiction to punish for contempt not
committed in its presence.

Bott v. Bott, 20 Utah 2d 329,

437 P.2d 684 (Ut. 1968); Robinson v. City Court ex rel. City
of Qqden, 112 Utah 36, 185 P.2d 256 (Ut. 1947); Crowther v.
District Court. 93 Utah 586, 54 P.2d 243 (Ut. 1936).
These statutory procedures and required service give
the accused written notice of the allegations.

The accused

also has the right to answer the charges against him, to
examine witnesses against him, to present evidence, and to
be represented by counsel.

Ut. Code Ann. § 78-32-9 (1953 as

amended); Robinson v. City Court ex rel. City of Qqden. 112
Ut. 36, 185 P.2d 256 (Ut. 1947); Burgers v. Maiben, 652 P.2d
1320 (Ut. 1982).
In Robinson v. City Court ex rel. City of Qqden, 112
Ut. 36, 185 P.2d 256 (Ut. 1947) this Court held in an
indirect contempt proceeding the accused is entitled:
a)

to know the nature and cause of accusation against

b)
c)
d)
e)

him,
to receive a copy thereof,
to be permitted to plead or respond,
to be represented by counsel, and
to be afforded the right to be heard.
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In Burgers v. Maiben. 652 P.2d 1320 (Ut. 1982) this
Court again articulated the due process requirements in an
indirect contempt proceeding/ adding to the list from
Robinson:
Thus, in a prosecution for contempt, not committed in
the presence of the court, due process requires that
the person charged be advised of the nature of the
action against him, have assistance of counsel, if
requested, have the right to confront the witnesses,
and have the right to offer testimony on his behalf.
Id. at 1322; State v. Halverson, 754 P.2d 1228 (Ut. Ct. App.
1988) .
Plaintiff herein was never given an opportunity to
confront and cross-examine Mr. Randazzo under oath, as to
his allegations against plaintiff.

Plaintiff was never

afforded the right to present testimony on his own behalf.
In State v. Halverson. 754 P.2d 1228 (Ut. Ct. App.
1988) , the attorney of record failed to appear for a
scheduled criminal trial and was summarily found in contempt
in his absence and without any hearing.

After the finding

was entered, the attorney requested a hearing and an
opportunity to present evidence; the trial court declined on
the basis that no evidence was necessary because the
contempt was direct, that is committed in the presence of
the court.

The Utah Court of Appeals determined that the

actions would be indirect contempt and this, due process
required written notice, the right to confront witnesses,
20

the presentation of evidence, etc.

The refusal of the

Halverson trial court to receive evidence even during the
post-deprivation hearing was fatal to the finding of
contempt, and the Court of Appeals vacated the finding of
contempt.
Due process of law requires that before a judgment of
indirect contempt may be made, there must be an evidentiary
hearing.

Ut. Code Ann. § 78-32-9 (1953 as amended) (the

court "must hear any answer which the person arrested may
make to the [charge of contempt], and may examine witnesses
for or against him. . . " ) ; Ut. Code Ann. § 78-32-10 (1953 as
amended) ("[u]pon the answer and evidence taken" the guilt
of the accused is determined.); State v. Halverson, 754 P.2d
1228 (Ut. Ct. App. 1988); Herald-Republican Pub. Co. v.
Lewis. 42 Utah 188, 129 P. 624 (1912).

No evidentiary

hearing was held before Judge Murphy regarding the alleged
contemptuous acts of Barnard.
The accused has the right to be heard on the merits
prior to the entry of a judgement of contempt.

Herald-

Republican Pub. Co. v. Lewis, 42 Utah 188, 129 P. 624
(1912) . Plaintiff was given no opportunity to be heard on
the merits prior to the entry of the order.
A judgement of contempt requires clear and convincing
evidence.

Von Hake v. Thomas, 759 P.2d 1162 (Ut. 1988);

Coleman v. Coleman, 664 P.2d 1155 (Ut. 1983); Thomas v.
21

Thomas. 569 P.2d 1119 (Ut. 1977).
evidence or proof in this case.

There was no such
As discussed infra, there

is no admissible evidence, much less clear and convincing
proof, of any mis-conduct by plaintiff.
Written finding of fact and conclusions of law are
required before a judgment of contempt may be entered.

Von

Hake v. Thomas, 759 P.2d 1162 (Ut« 1988); Thomas v. Thomas,
569 P.2d 1119 (Ut. 1977).

Failure to make written finding

and conclusions make the judgement of contempt unenforceable
and requires vacating the judgement.

Salzetti v. Backman,

638 P.2d 543 (Ut. 1981); Powers v. Taylor, 14 Ut.2d 118, 378
P.2d 519 (Ut. 1963).

There were inadequate or no findings

in the underlying case.
attached.)

(Exhibit "0" part of Exhibit "AA"

The absence of findings and conclusions voids

Judge Murphy's determination.
Four (4) elements are necessary for a finding of
contempt of court; they are:
the party knew what was required,
and having the ability to comply,
intentionally, willfully and knowingly
failed and refused to comply.
Ut. Farm Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Labrum, 762 P.2d 1070 (Ut.
1988); Von Hake v. Thomas, 759 P.2d 1162 (Ut. 1988); Coleman
v. Coleman, 664 P.2d 1155 (Ut. 1983); Thomas v. Thomas, 569
P.2d 1119 (Ut. 1977).

To support a judgement of contempt,

Judge Murphy was required to make factual finding and legal
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conclusions establishing each of these four (4) elements.
He made no such findings or legal conclusions.

The closest

statements to findings is defendant Murphy's recitation in
the Order that:
a)

Barnard did not give Mr. Randazzo timely

notice of the details of the Court's decision as
announced in Mr. Randazzo's absence on August 2, 1989,
and
b)

Barnard did not forward to Mr. Randazzo copies

of the proposed Findings of Fact and Decree of Divorce.
The lack of adequate findings of fact and conclusions of law
by Judge Murphy, the failure to follow proper procedures and
the failure to prove the four (4) required elements nullify
the judge's order.

POINT III
THERE IS NO FACTUAL
BASIS FOR JUDGE MURPHY'S
ORDER OF SANCTIONS
Assuming arguendo that the defendant Murphy had subject
matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction over the
plaintiff and his actions, there is no factual basis for
finding that plaintiff failed to properly represent his
client.

No facts show plaintiff to be in contempt of court.

At the September 13, 1989 hearing Mr. Randazzo was
never place under oath; thus, his representation about not
23

receiving notice, not being orally informed of the court's
trial decision and not receiving copies of the Findings and
Divorce Decree are only, representations, or as steited in
the Order, just "comments."
Countering those comments is the uncontrovertetd
Affidavit of Brian M. Barnard of September 18, 1989 setting
forth in detail under oath his actions in conveying notice
to Mr. Randazzo regarding the hearing, the decision and the
Findings.

That Affidavit established that plaintiff fully

informed Mr. Randazzo in a timely fashion of the court's
ruling and timely forwarded the proposed Findings and
Divorce Decree.

Exhibit "A" part of Exhibit "AA" attached.

To find plaintiff in contempt, the court must have
clear and convincing evidence of willful misconduct*
Coleman v. Coleman. 664 P.2d 1155 (Ut. 1983); Thomas v.
Thomas, 569 P.2d 1119 (Ut. 1977).

The evidence presented to

Judge Murphy does not even rise to the lesser standard of a
preponderance of the evidence.

There is no admissible

evidence to show that plaintiff failed in his duty to
represent Mr. Randazzo; in fact, the only valid evidence
presented establishes that plaintiff acted properly.
There are no facts to support the determination by
defendant Murphy that plaintiff acted improperly in
representing his former client.
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Defendant Murphy failed to

make findings of fact and conclusions of law to support the
imposition of sanctions against plaintiff,

POINT IV
THE AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES
ARE WITHOUT MERIT
Defendants offered five (5) affirmative defenses in
Answers to plaintiff's complaint.

They were (1) failure to

state a claim; (2) judicial immunity; (3) claim preclusion;
(4) issue preclusion; and, (5) waiver.

Plaintiff addresses

each affirmative defense below.

A. Plaintiff/s Complaint States A Claim Pursuant to 42
U.S.C. S 1983.
The complaint states a cause of action as a collateral
attack on a defective order.

Where lack of jurisdictional

renders a judgment void, that judgment is properly subject
to collateral attack.

See, e.g., Bowen v. Olson, 246 P.2d

602 (Ut. 1952); Ut. R Civ. Pro. 60(b) ("The procedure for
obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by motion as
prescribed in these rules or by an independent action
[emphasis added.]").
without jurisdiction.

Judge Murphy's Order was entered
Therefore, this collateral attack is

an appropriate method to challenge defendant Murphy7s
invalid Order.
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There are no substantive defects in plaintiff's cause
of action.

A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim

can be granted only if (1) plaintiff's complaint does not
give defendant fair notice of the nature and basis of the
claims against him# and (2) the allegations contained in the
complaint, if provedf would not establish that plaintiff is
entitled to relief.

E.g., Mason v. State, 656 P.2d 465 (Ut.

1982); Blackham v. Snelcrrove, 318 P.2d 642 (Ut. 1955).

When

evaluating whether plaintiff's complaint states a claim upon
which relief may be granted, the court must liberally
construe plaintiff's claim for relief.

Gill v. Timm, 720

P.2d 1352 (Ut. 1986).
Plaintiff's claims are advanced in part pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983.

Plaintiff's complaint expressly notifies

defendants that plaintiff's claims are based on 42 U.S.C. §
1983 (Complaint, at If 1, 2, 31, 40). An action pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 1983 lies where defendants have improperly
deprived plaintiff of a liberty or property right under
color of state law.
(1980).

Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640

Therefore, plaintiff states a claim if the facts he

avers establish (1) a constitutional violation, and (2)
state action.
The complaint, assuming all facts as plead can be
proven, states a cause of action cognizable under 42 U.S.C §
1983.

Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980) (plaintiff
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states § 1983 claim where defendant acts under color of
state law to deprive plaintiff of a federally guaranteed
right).

There is no question that Judge Murphy has the

power and the right, within appropriate due process
constraints, to sanction an attorney guilty of mis-conduct
before his court.

The basis of this suit is that Judge

Murphy had no subject matter and no personal jurisdiction
over the plaintiff when he orally imposed sanctions or when
he reduced those sanctions to writing.

This action seeks

declaratory relief that the procedures employed by defendant
Murphy deprived plaintiff of property and liberty without
due process.

This action does not seek an appellate review

of the merits of a decision of the Third District Court.
Plaintiff is challenging the process (or lack thereof)
by which the decision was rendered.

Plaintiff's action is

an appropriate means to mount such a challenge:
A § 1983 action may be brought for a violation of
procedural due process . . . .
In procedural due
process claims, the deprivation by state action of
a constitutionally protected interest in "life,
liberty, of property" is not in itself
unconstitutional; what is unconstitutional is the
deprivation of such an interest without due
process of law.
Zinermon v. Burch,

U.S.

, 110 S.Ct. 975, 983 (1990)

(emphasis in original) (cites omitted).
A due process violation does not occur simply because a
deprivation occurs.

It is complete upon the state's failure
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to provide constitutionally adequate procedural due process.
See Id.. at 983-984.
This is a collateral attack on a void judgment entered
without jurisdiction as authorized by Rule 60(b)(5),
Ut.R.Civ.Pro.

Plaintiff has the right to commence this

independent action for relief from that judgment and order.
Plaintiff is only tangentially contesting the merits of
Judge Murphy's order.

Plaintiff concedes that with proper

notice and opportunity to be heard, sanctions might still be
imposed.3
Contrary to defendants7 assertion a court can review
plaintiff's claimed denial of due process without "reviewing
the record of the Third District Court proceedings and the
propriety of Judge Murphy's order based upon that record."
The facts of this case are not "inextricably intertwined"
with the facts of the underlying divorce action, Randazzo v.
Randazzo.

This case can be resolved without any

consideration of the facts of that divorce action and with
out any consideration of the facts alleged to justify the
imposition of sanctions upon the plaintiff.

Plaintiff's

attempt to invalidate the order of sanctions is based upon

3

See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978) (the fact
that the same result might have occurred even with adequate
due process protection is not a defense to a claim of denial
of procedural due process).
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procedural considerations and is unrelated to whether
sanctions should ultimately be imposed upon the plaintiff*4
1. Judge Murphy deprived plaintiff of protected
interests without due process.
Judge Murphy's Order deprived plaintiff of protected
property and liberty interests without pre-deprivation due
process.

An improper deprivation of property occurs where a

court orders a debtor not to pay a creditor without
providing the creditor appropriate due process protection.
Cf., North Georgia Finishing Inc. v. Di-Chem Inc., 419 U.S.
601 (1975) (statute allowing garnishment of property without
adequate pre-deprivation due process violated the 14th
Amendment due process guarantees).

Likewise, a deprivation

of liberty occurs where a plaintiff's integrity is harmed in
conjunction with a deprivation of property, without
appropriate due process protection.
U.S.

Zinermon v. Burch,

, 110 S.Ct 975 (1990) (especially where the state is

in a position to provide a pre-deprivation hearing, "[a] §
1983 action may be brought for a violation of procedural due
process . . . .fl Id., at 983).
Here, plaintiff provided legal services for which his
former client owed plaintiff over Four Hundred Dollars
4

The thrust of this case is how does a trial court
judge impose sanctions for improper conduct against an
attorney, no longer counsel of record for a party. The
appropriate method is set out in the statutes and case law
as to indirect contempt as discussed supra.
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($400.00+) in fees.

Without notice or hearing, Judge Murphy

deprived plaintiff of his vested property interest in the
former client's payment of those fees.
Defendant Shirley Randazzo is an indispensable party.
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 19(a)(2).

If this

action is successful, the rights of Ms. Randazzo will be
affected.

Her entitlement to payment from plaintiff's

former client before the former client pays plaintiff's
attorney fees will be nullified.
indispensable party.5

Therefore, she is an

Limits on plaintiff's ability to file

a claim for the full indebtedness owed by Mr. Randazzo in
Mr. Randazzo's bankruptcy proceeding is a property interest.
If the facts in the complaint are proved, plaintiff has
demonstrated that he was deprived of a property interest
without adequate due process in violation of the 14th
amendment.
Where injury to plaintiff's reputation occurs in
conjunction with a property deprivation, the injury is
actionable under the 14th amendment.

See Goss v. Lopez, 419

U.S. 565 (1977) (actionable deprivation of liberty where

5

Just as plaintiff herein complains that Judge Murphy
deprived him of property without due process on September
13, 1989, Ms. Randazzo would have a similar complaint of
deprivation without due process if she were not a party to
this action which seeks to reverse a decision that granted
her and/or her counsel money taken from plaintiff's accounts
receivable.
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damage to reputation is coupled with diminished future
education and employment opportunities). At the hearing in
which Judge Murphy deprived plaintiff of the property
interest the Judge also impugned plaintiff's professional
reputation.

The judge pursuant to the unsworn testimony,

found that plaintiff had failed to notify his former client
of rulings and hearings.

The Order damaged plaintiff's

professional reputation to the extent that he might be
deprived of future employment and professional
opportunities.

If the facts in the complaint are proved,

defendant will be liable for depriving plaintiff of a
protected liberty interest without adequate due process in
violation of the 14th Amendment.

2. Plaintiff is not seeking a review or an appeal of the
merits of Judge Murphy's decision.
There is no question that Judge Murphy has the power
and the right, with appropriate due process protections, to
impose sanctions against an attorney guilty of contemptuous
mis-conduct.

Plaintiff does not challenge the right of

Judge Murphy to impose sanctions when imposed with due
process.
To the contrary, plaintiff seeks a determination of the
invalidity of Judge Murphy's order on the grounds that it
was improperly entered, that is, without jurisdiction,
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without due process and without proper procedures —

the

challenge is one of procedure and not one of the mejrits. As
the U.S. Supreme Court declared in Zinermon, supra %
In procedural due process claims, the deprivation
by state action of a constitutionally protected
interest in "life, liberty, or property" is not in
itself unconstitutional; what is unconstitutional
is the deprivation of such an interest without due
process of law.
Id., at 983 (emphasis in original), citing Parratt 451 U.S.
at 537; Carev v. Piohus. 435 U.S. 247, 259 (1978).
The court declared further, "a deprivation of procedural due
process is actionable under § 1983 without regard to whether
the same deprivation would have taken place even in the
presence of proper procedural safeguards."

Zinermon, at 983

n.ll, citing Carey, ar 266.

B•

Judge Murphy Is Not Entitled To Judicial Immunity.

This action does not seek damages against Judge Murphy
but only declaratory and injunctive relief.

In Pulliam v.

Allen, 466 U.S. 522 (1984), the Court held that judicial
immunity does not extend to claims for prospective relief
against a judicial officer acting in her judicial capacity,
or to a 42 U.S.C. § 1988 claim for attorney's fees.
Therefore, Judge Murphy is not entitled to judicial
immunity.

As long as the order remains enforceable,

plaintiff suffers an ongoing deprivation of protected
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property and liberty interests.

The Order prevents

plaintiff from recovering his property and harms his liberty
interests.

Here, just as in Pulliam, supra. plaintiff seeks

perspective relief from an ongoing unconstitutional
practice.
The statements regarding judicial immunity contained in
Navaio Nation v. District Court for Utah County, 624 F.Supp.
130 (D. Utah 1985) cited by defendant Murphy, cannot be
applied to this matter for at least two indisputable
reasons.

In Navaio Nation, the Tribe sought to effectively

overturn another court's finding that state adoption
procedures did not violate the Tribe's statutory and
constitutional rights.

Id., at 135.

The first reason that Navaio Nation cannot be applied
here is that in that case the court expressly determined
that the Tribe was merely seeking appellate review of the
adoption court's decision.

Id., at 137. Here, plaintiff

does not challenge the merits of Judge Murphy's Order.
Plaintiff seeks relief from that judgment because it was
rendered absent subject matter and personal jurisdiction,
and in violation of plaintiff's due process rights. Hence,
Pulliam controls here, not Navaio Nations.
The second reason Navaio Nations cannot control here is
that the Navaio Nations court did not hold that the Tribe's
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claims were barred by judicial immunity.

That court's

statements regarding judicial immunity were mere dictas
Although we need not reach the question of
judicial immunity, this Court finds it appropriate
to address this point as an additional basis for
dismissal of the claims against defendant Judge
David Sam.
Id., at 136.

The court had already determined that the

Tribe'& claims were barred.

Hence, the court's subsequent

statements were not necessary to the final disposition of
the matter, and the statements do not constitute any part of
the final judgment.

The statements as pure dicta cannot

control here.
Judicial immunity does not apply when, as in the
underlying case, Judge Murphy was acting beyond his
jurisdiction.
Cir. 1985).

Martinez v. Winner. 771 F*2d 424, 434 (10th

As fully set out supra, Judge Murphy was

outside his jurisdiction in imposing sanctions upon
plaintiff.

Thus, defendant Murphy is not protected by

judicial immunity.
Finally, Pulliam v. Allen, supra, cannot be read to
limit judicial immunity in only those cases where the
unconstitutional conduct to be enjoined is ongoing.

The

language of Pulliam clearly applies to any enjoinable,
future judicial action, whether or not that action is an
ongoing practice of the judge.

Id., at 541-542 ("[J]udicial

immunity is not a bar to prospective injunctive relief
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against a judicial officer acting in her judicial
capacity").

No cases can be cited showing otherwise.

Judge Murphy did not even begin to comply with the case
law and statutory procedures required to punish someone for
indirect contempt; thus, he lacked jurisdiction to impose
sanctions.

Acting without jurisdiction, Judge Murphy is not

entitled to judicial immunity.
If the interpretation of judicial immunity made by the
trial court herein were correct, a judge could never be sued
in a collateral attack or in an action seeking an extraordinary writ.

During the pendency of this action plaintiff

herein sued Judge Brian the trial court judge in this case
seeking an extraordinary writ to correct an error committed
in Judge Brian,s handling of this case.

Barnard vs. Brian,

Ut. Sup. Court Case No. 91-0040. Obviously, Judge Brian was
not immune from that suit in which this Court acted to
correct his error.

Kelsev v. The Hon. Timothy R. Hanson,

818 P.2d 590, 170 Ut.Adv.Rep. 41 (Ut.App. 1991)(extraordinary writ issued against judge to correct error as to
consideration of affidavit of impecuniosity)•
Judge Brian's interpretation of judicial immunity would
severely limit the provision of Rule 60(b) Ut.R.Civ.Pro.
allowing for collateral attacks or independent actions to
challenge invalid judgments or orders. Although a
collateral attack often will name only parties to an action
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as defendants, designating Judge Murphy as a defendant in
this collateral attack is appropriate, if not mandatory,
because the order of sanctions was entered sua sponte by
Judge Murphy.

At the September 13, 1989 hearing neither

Shirley Randazzo nor her counsel requested sanctions against
plaintiff; without request from anyone, Judge Murphy
summarily imposed sanctions!
If the trial court'& interpretation of judicial
immunity were correct, the only avenue to challenge an error
by a judge would be an appeal.

Neither defendants nor the

trial court judge cite any authority for such a proposition.
Judicial immunity protects a judge from a suit for
damages.

Judicial immunity does not protect a judge from an

action in equity to correct errors, to invalidate judgments
entered without jurisdiction or to prevent the future
enforcement of an improperly entered order.

C*

Plaintiff's Claims Are Not Barred By Res Judicata

The doctrine of res judicata comprises two distinct
concepts:

(1) claim preclusion, and (2) issue preclusion.

Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245 (Ut. 1988)*
Prior to filing this action, plaintiff filed a similar
action in United States District Court for the District of
Utah.

The federal case was dismissed for lack of subject

matter jurisdiction.

(Order of Judge C. Brimmer, dated May
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4, 1990, Exhibit "EE" attached)

This case is almost the

same as the federal case which Judge Brimmer dismissed,
however, neither claim preclusion nor issue preclusion bar
this case.

1. The federal dismissal order does not preclude
plaintiffs claim.
A claim can be precluded by a previous action only
where "a second claim between the same parties or their
privies concerning the same claim or cause of action
previously rendered final by judgment of the merits." Dept.
of Social Services v. Ruscetta, 742 P.2d 114, 116 (Ut. App.
1987), citing Copper State Thrift & Loan v. Bruno, 735 P.2d
387 (Ut. App. 1987); Penrod v. Nu Creation Creme, Inc., 669
P.2d 873 (Ut. 1983); Krofcheck v. Downey State Bank, 580
P.2d 243 (Ut. 1978).
The ruling of federal Judge Brimmer in the prior case
was a determination that the federal court lacked subject
matter jurisdiction.

A judgment does not have claim

preclusion effect where the prior claim was dismissed for
want of jurisdiction.

E.g., Smith v. McNeal, 109 U.S. 426

(1883); Hvdaburg Co-op Ass'n v. United States, 667 F.2d 64
(Ct. CI. 1981) (when an action is dismissed on jurisdictional grounds, findings on the merits are a nullity); see
also Friedenthal & Miller, Sum and Substance of Civil
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Procedure. § 16.4341 (1985) ("A dismissal because of
improper venue or a lack of personal or subject matter
jurisdiction is never on the merits . . . ." (Emphasis
added)).
The federal ruling of Judge Brimmer expressly stated:
[A] federal district court is without jurisdiction
to review a state court judicial decision. The
Order which is the source of [plaintiff's]
complaint is just such a judicial decision, and
this Court therefore does not have jurisdiction to
hear this case.
Exhibit "EE" attached at 6.

The federal judge dismissed

plaintifffs federal court claim for want of jurisdiction,
thus any reference by Judge Brimmer to judicial immunity is
dicta.

While the trial court may make an independent

determination of Judge Murphy's claim of judicial immunity,
the federal determination does not and cannot bar
plaintiff7s claim in this action.

2. The previous federal ruling cannot control the trial
court's independent determination on the issue of Judge
Murphy's immunity.
Judge Murphy argues that the previous federal ruling
established that he was immune from plaintiff's claims.
Therefore, he concludes, plaintiff is precluded from relitigating the issue of immunity.
This Court has defined four (4) elements which must be
established before an issue may be precluded by a previous
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proceeding.

E.g., Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245, 250

(Ut. 1988) . Plaintiff addresses only the second element
here, because Judge Murphy7s issue preclusion defense fails
completely on that element.

The second element of the issue

preclusion test is "the judgment must be final with respect
to that issue."
As set forth above, the federal ruling was expressly
that the federal court lacked subject matter jurisdiction.
A dismissal for want of jurisdiction is a matter of form,
not a final determination of the parties' legal rights.
Ruscetta, 742 P.2d at 117.

See also Robertson v. Campbell,

674 P.2d 1226, 1230 (Ut. 1983) ("What is critical is whether
the issue that was actually litigated in the first suit was
essential to resolution of that suit. . . . "

(Emphasis

added))•
Where a claim is dismissed for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction, the merits of the claim have
not been adjudicated. Penrod, 669 P.2d at 877.
Ruscetta, at 116.
Here, the federal court's dicta on judicial immunity
was not necessary to the proceeding's final disposition.
While the issue of judicial immunity was raised in the
federal case, it was not "adjudicated."

The issue was not a

part of the federal court's final judgment.

The federal

court's gratuitous dicta cannot preclude the trial court's
independent determination of judicial immunity in this case.
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Clearly, the previous dismissal for want of subject
matter jurisdiction cannot preclude plaintiff's claim.

Nor

does the previous dismissal preclude independent determination of judicial immunity asserted by Judge Murphy as
a defense.

There was no final adjudication on the merits,

thus neither res judicata nor collateral estoppel apply to
the current action.

D. Plaintiff Did Not Waive His Right to Challenge The
Validity of Judge Murphy's Order.
The defendant Murphy presents no facts to establish
that the doctrine of waiver is applicable.

In fact,

defendant Murphy failed to state in his answer what he
claims the plaintiff "waived."

Murphy's Answer, p. 5.

later summary judgment memorandum is more specific.

A

There

he claims plaintiff herein "waived his claim of
constitutional injury" (T.R. p. 46; Defendant Murphy's
Summary Judgment Memo, at 12) and waived a hearing on his
objection to the

offending order (id., at 5-6, 12 et seq.).

Judge Murphy's claim of waiver does not apply in this case.
Plaintiff was entitled to pre-deprivation due process,
regardless of any available post-deprivation remedies.
Plaintiff received no pre-deprivation hearing.

A waiver of

his constitutional rights cannot be inferred from
plaintiff's actions.
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1. Plaintiff was entitled to pre-deprivation due
process.
Pre-deprivation due process is necessary where it could
decrease the risk of erroneous decisions without imposing an
onerous burden on the state.

Zinermon vs. Burch, 110 S. Ct.

at 987; Mathews vs. Eldredae, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).

Post-

deprivation due process may be adequate specifically where
pre-deprivation procedures are impractical, or where they
would not add to the reliability of the decisions.
Zinermon. at 984-985, citing, Parratt vs. Taylor, 451 U.S.
527 (1981), overruled in part not relevant here, Daniels vs.
Williams. 474 U.S. 327 (1986).
If pre-deprivation procedure was due, it is no answer
that the state provided post-deprivation procedures.

In

Zinermon, the state provided post-deprivation procedures.
In Zinermon, the state defendants sought to avoid § 1983
liability by arguing that the plaintiff could pursue tort
remedies as a result of his unlawful confinement in a mental
institution.

The Supreme Court declared!

It is no answer that the State has a law which if
enforced would give relief. The federal remedy is
supplementary to the State remedy, and the latter
need not be first sought and refused before the
federal one is invoked.
Id., at 982, quoting Monroe vs. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 173-174
(1961).
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Here, Judge Murphy should have provided more due
process before depriving plaintiff of his protected
interests.

Swearing in Mr. Randazzo, and giving plaintiff

notice and a hearing before issuing the sanction order would
not have imposed any significant burden.

Yet, such measures

would have greatly decreased the risk that plaintiff would
be erroneously deprived.

2.

Plaintiff received no pre-deprivation due process.
In this case, plaintiff did not receive nor did he

waive a pre-deprivation hearing —

he was never offered one.

Judge Murphy claims that plaintiff waived his objection
and a hearing thereupon.6

However, the decision of whether

6

Judge Murphy's argument about "waiving a hearing11
misses the mark. There is no question that plaintiff
indicated to Judge Murphy's clerk that oral argument was not
necessary — that is, there was no need for the parties to
physically appear before Judge Murphy and orally present
arguments, etc.
A "waiver" of oral argument, which occurred, is very
different from a claim that plaintiff withdrew his objection
or waived his right to contest the defective order of
sanctions. When plaintiff waived an oral presentation, he
had already submitted an objection, written arguments, an
affidavit, etc. contesting the proposed order. Judge Murphy
submits no evidence to suggest that plaintiff's waiver of
oral argument was a waiver of the merits of plaintiff's
objection
With or without oral argument, the fact remains plaintiff presented valid claims that the order of sanctions was
improper. Judge Murphy entered the sanctions overruling
plaintiff's objections.
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to grant a hearing was entirely within the discretion of
Judge Murphy!

Rule 4-501, Code of Judicial Administration

(1988) (before an extensively amended version became
effective on January 15, 1990), read:
(8) Decision on a motion shall be rendered
without a hearing unless requested by the Court,
in which even the Clerk shall schedule a date and
time for such hearing. If a hearing is not
requested by the Court, counsel shall notify the
Clerk of the Court, in writing to submit the
motion to the Court for decision . • .
(9) In cases where the granting of a motion
would dispose of the action or any issues therein
on the merits with prejudice, the party resisting
the motion may request a hearing and such request
shall be granted unless the motion is summarily
denied . . .
(Emphasis added).
In short, plaintiff filed the objection and request for
a hearing, both of which Judge Murphy summarily denied when
he signed the Order on October 12, 1989.

Plaintiff was

informed that he could have a hearing after Judge Murphy had
already signed the offending Order, thus ending even a
semblance of a pre-deprivation proceedings.

(The hearing

actually offered was for a non-existent motion to set aside
the signed order.)
This court need not determine how much pre-deprivation
process was due plaintiff.

The complaint demonstrates that

plaintiff was entitled to some pre-deprivation protection,
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and received none.

Judge Murphy's claim of waiver cannot

stand.

3. Nothing in plaintiff's actions constitute a knowing
waiver of his constitutional rights.
Courts are reluctant to find that persons have waived
constitutional rights absent proof not only that such waiver
occurred, but also that the waiver was knowing and
voluntary.

Jones vs. Taber, 648 F.2d 1201 (9th Cir. 1981).

A failure to follow statutorily or administratively
defined post-deprivation procedures may preclude a plaintiff
from challenging the defined post-deprivation procedures on
due process grounds.

In such cases, however, the party

waived the right to challenge post-deprivation procedures by
failing to utilize those post-deprivation procedures.7

By

contrast, the plaintiff herein is challenging the adequacy
of pre-deprivation process.

He did not waive any statutory

7

Defendant Murphy cites Weinrauch vs. Park City, 751
F.2d 357 (10th Cir. 1984) (plaintiff essentially stole her
car from the impound lot rather than seeking a postimpoundment hearing, thereby forgoing her right to challenge
the constitutional adequacy of that hearing); Riggins vs.
Board of Regents of the University of Nebraska, 790 F.2d 707
(8th Cir. 1986) (plaintiff chose means other than the
established grievance procedure to appeal her discharge,
thereby forgoing her right to challenge the constitutional
adequacy of the post-discharge procedures); Jacobus vs.
Heydiner, 643 F.Supp„ 550 (S.D.W.Va. 1986) (plaintiff
appealed his discharge to courts outside the statutorily and
administratively defined grievance process, thereby forgoing
his right to challenge the constitutional adequacy of that
process).
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or administrative pre-deprivation procedures•

Further,

plaintiff did not waive any post deprivation rights.

At

worst, plaintiff waived oral arguments, he did not withdraw
or waive his objection.

Even without oral arguments, Judge

Murphy should have been able to see the major defects in his
order of sanctions.
Judge Murphy's signature on the Order in October
rendered meaningless any comments the plaintiff made to the
Judge's clerk in November.

That plaintiff waived oral

argument and said he would pursue the matter in a different
forum was necessitated by the Judge having denied
plaintiff's objection to the Order, and was not indicative
of any waiver of his objections and claims flowing from
constitutional injury.
There is no question with regard to the lack of a predeprivation hearing.

The only thing plaintiff waived was

oral argument.

CONCLUSION
The court below erred in dismissing plaintiff's action
in that the complaint stated a cause o± action as a
collateral attack against an order improperly entered.
Plaintiff's cause of action was not barred by the doctrines
of res judicata or judicial immunity, nor was plaintiff's
claim waived by plaintiff.
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RELIEF
This court should determine and find that plaintiff's
complaint stated a cause of action and was properly before
the court below.
Further, this Court should find and determine that:
—

defendant Judge Murphy was without subject matter

and without personal jurisdiction to enter sanctions against
Barnard in the Randazzo v. Randazzo case.
~

defendant Judge Murphy lacked sufficient facts and

evidence to impose sanctions in the Randazzo v. Randazzo
case.
~

defendant Judge Murphy failed to make the necessary

factual findings to support a determination of contempt.
-- defendant Judge Murphy failed to comply with the
statutory provisions and pre-requisites before imposing
sanctions in the Randazzo v. Randazzo case.
—

defendant Judge Murphy denied due process o£ law to

plaintiff in imposing sanctions against plaintiff in the
Randazzo v. Randazzo case.
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This Court should reverse the decisions of the Trial
Court and remand this matter with directions to grant to
plaintiff the relief sought in his complaint.
DATED this 31st day of AUGUST, 1992.
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC
Attorneys for Plaintiff/
Appellant

BRIAN M. BARNARD
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APPENDIX

(AA)

Complaint, May 31, 1990, T.R. p. 2.

(BB)

Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law,
Judgment and Order of Dismissal as against
Defendant Judge Murphy, April 5, 1991,
ToRe p. 345.

(CC)

Order of Dismissal as against
Defendant Randazzo, April 28, 1992, T.R.
p. 410.

(DD)

Notice of Appeal, May 6, 1992, T.R. p.
413.

(EE)

Order of Dismissal by the Hon. Clarence
Brimmer, United States District Court, May
4, 1990.

(FF)

Letter to Defendant Murphy from plaintiff,
dated October 4, 1989.
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BRIAN M. BARNARD
USB #0215
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC
Attorneys for Plaintiff
214 East Fifth South
Salt Lake City, Utah
84111-3204
Phone; (801) 328-9531 or 328-9532
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY

STATE OF UTAH

SRIAN M. BARNARD,
Plaintiff,

civil N O . & > ^ £ > ? 0 ? # 2 7 < r 2 S
COMPLAINT

ANN L. WASSERMANN,
SHIRLEY RANDAZZO,
and
THE HON. MICHAEL MURPHY,
Judge of the Third District
Court in and for Salt Lake
County, State of Utah,

(Judge j ^ T o f t ?

)

Defendants.

THE PLAINTIFF, BRIAN M. BARNARD, by and through his
counsel of record, Brian M. Barnard of Utah Legal Clinic as
a complaint and cause of action against the defendants, ANN
L. WASSERMANN, SHIRLEY RANDAZZO and the Hon. MICHAEL MURPHY
states and alleges as follows:

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
1.

This is a civil action for declaratory and injunc-

tive relief to redress a deprLvati HI of property and liberty
in violation of the constitution and laws of the United
States.

The plaintiff seeks no damages.

The plaintiff

seeks declaratory relief that an order of the Third Judicial
District Court entered by the Hon. MICHAEL MURPHY for the
benefit of the other defendants is invalid, null and void,
in part for lack of personal jurisdiction.

The plaintiff

further seeks injunctive relief to prevent the enforcement
of said order.

The plaintiff seeks attorney fees and court

costs pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988.

JURISDICTION
2.

Jurisdiction is based on 42 U.S.C* § 1983. Juris-

diction is further based upon Ut. Code Ann. § 78-3-4 (1953
as amended) and Rule 60 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

Declaratory relief is authorized by Ut. Code Ann. and

the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure•

Injunctive relief is

authorized by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

VENUE
3.

All of the conduct complained of occurred in Salt

Lake County, Utah.

All of the named individual parties to

this action reside in Salt Lake County, Utah.

PARTIES
4.

The plaintiff BRIAN M. BARNARD is an adult citizen

and resident of Salt Lake County,, Utah.

He is an attorney

admitted to practice before the Courts of the State of Utah.
5.

The defendant ANN L. WASSERMANN is an adult citizen

and resident of Salt Lake County, Utah.

She is an attorney

admitted to practice before the Courts of the State of Utah.
She is named as a party because this cause of action affects
her rights.
6.

The defendant SHIRLEY RANDAZZO is an adult citizen

and resident of Salt Lake County, Utah.

She is named as a

party because this cause of action affects her rights.
7.

Frank Randazzo is an adult citizen and resident of

Salt Lake County, Utah.
action.

He is not a defendant in this

The plaintiff may seek (subject to courts1 ap-

proval) to amend his complaint at some future date to name
his as a defendant.
8.

The defendant the Hon. MICHAEL MURPHY is an adult

citizen and resident of Salt Lake County, Utah.

He is a

judge of the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt
Lake County, State of Utah.

FACTS
9.

The plaintiff formerly represented Frank Randazzo

in a divorce action in the Third Judicial District Court in
and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah (Case No. 88-4904130
DA) captioned SHIRLEY RANDAZZO vs. FRANK RANDAZZO.
10.

That action was tried to the Court, the Hon.

MICHAEL MURPHY, judge presiding on August 1, 1989.
11.

After the trial in said matter, and prior to

September 13, 1989, plaintiff withdrew as counsel for Frank
Randazzo for various reasons and gave notice of that withdrawal to the Third District Court, to Frank Randazzo and to
ANN WASSERMANN.
12.

On September 13, 1989 a hearing was held in said

divorce action.

The plaintiff was not present; present were

all of the named defendants and Frank Randazzo,

The hearing

was to consider the alleged contempt of court by Frank
Randazzo for failure to comply with the rulings of the
Court•
13.

At said hearing, Frank Randazzo made certain

representations to the Court regarding plaintiff's representation of Frank Randazzo.

Those representations were not

made under oath.

Those representations were, at least in

part, false, incomplete and/or mis-leading.
14.

At the hearing of September 13, 1989, the Court,

the Hon. MICHAEL MURPHY, judge presiding made an oral ruling
to the effect that the plaintiff, Brian M. Barnard, had
acted improperly in his representation of Frank Randazzo.
The Court made an oral ruling to the effect that the Frank
Randazzo should not pay to the plaintiff the sum of four
hundred and thirty dollars, ($430.00), and a portion of fees
owed to the plaintiff incurred in plaintiff's representation
of Frank Randazzo.

Instead, Frank Randazzo should pay that

amount to SHIRLEY RANDAZZO and ANN L. WASSERMANN as and for
attorney fees and costs incurred by SHIRLEY RANDAZZO.
SHIRLEY RANDAZZO and ANNE WASSERMANN had requested that, at
the hearing, attorney fees be assessed against Frank
Randazzoe
15.

The plaintiff was not given notice that the

hearing of September 13, 1989 would involve or consider any
alleged mis-conduct of the plaintiff.

The plaintiff was not

given notice that said hearing would involve or consider the
imposition of any sanction against the plaintiff.
16.

The plaintiff was not requested to be present at

said hearing and was not given any opportunity to be heard
at said hearing.

17 • After said hearing and based upon the oral ruling
of the Hon. MICHAEL MURPHY, ANN L. WASSERMANN prepared a
proposed order embodying the decision of the Court.

A true

and correct copy of that proposed order is attached hereto,
marked Exhibit "0" and incorporated herein by reference.
ANN L. WASSERMANN mailed a copy of said order to the plaintiff on or about September 15, 1989«
18.

Said oral ruling and the order (Exhibit "0")

deprive the plaintiff of property in the sum of four hundred
and thirty dollars ($430.00) owed by Frank Randazzo to the
plaintiff.

The Order provides that prior to paying any

money owed by Frank Randazzo to the plaintiff, Frank
Randazzo must pay four hundred and thirty dollars ($430.00)
to ANN WASSERMANN for the benefit of SHIRLEY RANDAZZO.

The

Order provides that Frank Randazzo is to receive credit from
the plaintiff as against funds owed to plaintiff by Frank
Randazzo in the amount of four hundred and thirty dollars
($430.00) for that which Frank Randazzo is required to pay
to ANN WASSERMANN.
19.

Said oral ruling ami fhe order (Exhibit "O") harm

the plaintiff's good name and reputation in that there are
statements in said order in the nature of findings to the
effect that the plaintiff failed or acted improperly in his
representation of Frank Randazzo.

20.
(Exhibit

In response to receipt of said proposed Order
lf

O") the plaintiff filed an Objection with th Court

on or about September 18, 1989.
attached hereto marked Exhibit

A copy of that Objection is

,f

B" and incorporated herein

by reference.
21.

In response to receipt of said proposed order

(Exhibit "0") the plaintiff filed an Affidavit with the
Court on or about September 18, 1989.

A copy of that

Affidavit is attached hereto marked Exhibit ftA,f and incorporated herein by reference.
22.

On or about September 20, 1989 the plaintiff

requested a hearing before the defendant, the Hon. MICHAEL
MURPHY to consider plaintiff's Objection (Exhibit "B").

A

copy of that request for hearing is marked Exhibit "R",
attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference,

No

hearing was held in response to that request.
23.

After the filing of said Objection (Exhibit "B")

and said Affidavit (Exhibit "A") and without further hearing, the Hon. MICHAEL MURPHY on or about October 12f 1989
overruled the objection of the plaintiff hereinf and signed
and entered the Order (Exhibit "O").

That order is a matter

of public record.
24.

As a result of the signing and entry of said

Order, the plaintiff has been deprived of property without
due process.

25•

As a result uf the signing ami entry

of said

Order9 the plaintiff has been deprived of a liberty interest
without due process, by harm done to his good name and
reputation,
26.

The defendant, the Hon. MICHAEL MURPHY and has

used his power arid authority as a judge of the Third Judicial District Court to deprive the plaintiff of property and
liberty without due process.
27.

The defendant SHIRLEY RANDAZZO has benefited from

the action of the defendant the Hon. MICHAEL MURPHY as set
forth above to deprive the plaintiff of property and liberty
without due process, in that her attorney will receive
attorney fees taken from those nwrd by Frank Randazzo to the
plaintiff, and thus reduce the fees owed by SHIRLEY RANDAZZO
to ANN L. WASSERMANN.
28.

The defendant ANN L. WASSERMANN has benefited from

the action of the defendant the Hon. MICHAEL MURPHY as set
forth above to deptive the plaintiff of property without due
process, in that she will receive attorney fees taken from
fees owed to the plaintiff by Frank Randazzo.
29.

The plaintiff is not a party to the divorce action

between SHIRLEY RANDAZZO and Frank Randazzo.

He is no

longer attorney f<n Fiank Randazzo and w.is not counsel of
record when the Order (Exhibit "0") was entered.

The

plaintiff has no power to appeal said Order through the Utah

State Courts.

The plaintiff lacks standing to appeal said

Order through the Utah State Courts.
30.

The actions of the defendant were taken under

color of state law, custom, policy or practice.

The actions

of the Hon. MICHAEL MURPHY as set forth above were purportedly taken under the power granted to him as a Judge of the
District Court of the State of Utah.

CAUSE OF ACTION
31.

The actions of the defendant, the Hon. MICHAEL

MURPHY as set forth above constitute a violation of 42
U.S0C. § 1983 and a deprivation of property and liberty
without due process of law.
32.

Plaintiff was denied due process as guaranteed by

the Utah Constitution.
33.

The actions of the defendant MURPHY as set forth

above has caused harm to the plaintiff.
34.

The defendant, the Hon. MICHAEL MURPHY assessed

attorney fees against the plaintiff without personal jurisdiction over the plaintiff to do so; he did so without
receiving or hearing any sworn evidence,
35.

The plaintiff is entitled to declaratory relief

that the Order (Exhibit "0") in so far as it deprives the
plaintiff of property without due process is null and void.

36.

The plaintiff is entitled to declaratory relief

that the Order (Exhibit "0") in so far as it deprives the
plaintiff of a liberty interest (his good name and reputation) without due process is null and void.
37.

The plaintiff is entitled to declaratory and

injunctive relief that the Order (Exhibit "0") in so far as
it deprives the plaintiff of property without due process is
unenforceable.
38•

The plaintiff is entitled to declaratory and

injunctive relief that the Order (Exhibit "0") was improperly entered by the Court without personal jurisdiction over
the plaintiff is thus unenforceable.
39.

The plaintiff is entitled to declaratory and

injunctive relief that the Order (Exhibit

f, M

0 ) in so far as

it deprives the plaintiff of a liberty interest (his good
name and reputation) without due process in unenforceable.
40*

The plaintiff has incurred costs and attorney fees

in this action and is entitled to re-imbursement under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 and § 1988.

RELIEF
WHEREFORE, plaintiff demands a judgment determing said
order is null and void and enjoining the enforcement thereof
plus attorney fees and costs and the relief set forth above.
DATED this 31st day of MAY, 1990.
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC
Attorneys for Plaintiff^^,

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on the 31st day of MAY, 1990 I
caused to be mailed a copy of the above and foregoing
COMPLAINT to:
CRAIG PETERSON, Esq.
426 South 5th East
Salt Lake City, Utah

84102

WENDY FABER, Esq.
Giauque, Williams, et al
Keams Building
# 500
136 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah
84101
CARLIE CHRISTENSEN, Esq.
230 South 5th East
Salt Lake City, Utah
84102
postage prepaid in the United States Postal Service.
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC

Attorney for Plaintiff

ANN L. WASSERMANN - A3395
Attorney for Plaintiff
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON
426 South 500 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone; (801) 531-0435
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
—-ooOoo

•-•

—-

SHIRLEY N. RANDAZZO,
ORDER
Plaintiff,
vc
f-KANK A. RANDAZZO,
Defendant.

Case No. 884904130DA
Judge Michael R. Murphy
-ooOoo-

Plaintiff's Motion for Finding of Contempt came on for
luMring on September 13, 1989, at the hour of 3:00 p e m., the
Honorable Michael R. Murphy presiding.

Plaintiff appeared in

person and was represented by counsel, Ann L* Wassermann, Esq.
initially, Defendant did not appear. The Court made telephonic
contact with the Defendant, who subsequently appeared.

He was

not represented by counsel. The Court having considered the
pleadings, the proffer of counsel for the Plaintiff, and the comments of the Defendant and it appearing to the Court that the
Defendant did not receive notice of the hearing, and it further
appearing that Defendant's former counsel did not give Defendant

-1-

r

PLAINT!
evuif

timely notice of the details of the Courtfs decision as announced
on August 2, 1989, and it further appearing that Defendant's
counsel did not forward to Defendant copies of the proposed
Findings of Fact and Decree of Divorce, and it further appearing
that the Defendant had made good faith efforts to comply with the
Court's orders upon learning of them,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows:
1*

Plaintiff's Motion for Finding of Contempt is

2*

Plaintiff is granted leave to amend the Findings of

denied.

Fact and Conclusions of Law and the Decree of Divorce previously
entered in this matter to provide that Defendant shall be
:iquired to reimburse her for all monies expended by her as a
it.ult ol Defendant1:; failure to comply with previous Court
orders requiring him to make payments to the credit union.

Those

amounts shall be paid by Defendant to Plaintiff on or before
December 13, 1989.
3.

Defendant shall pay to Plaintiff the sum of S4 30.00

JS a:id for attorney§s fees incurred by Plaintiff in connection
A'lth this contempt proceeding.

The Defendant is ordered not to

pay any money to his former counsel, Drian Barnard, until the
award of attorney's fees is paid to counsel for the Plaintiff.
Airthcr, any monies paid by Defendant to counsel for Plaintiff in
:\:iijtaction of this obligation shall bo credited, dollar for

-2-

dollar against Defendaat's outstanding balance with his prior
counsel, Brian Barnard.
DATED this ____. day of September, 1989.
BY THE COURT:

HON. MICHAEL R. MURPHX
District Court Judge
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I horeby certify that I caused to be mailed a true and
correct copy of the foregoing Order, this I)
1969.

day of September,

to:
Mr. Frank Randazzo
6458 South 1140 West
Murray, Utah 84123
Mr. Brian M. Barnard, Esq.
Utah Legal Clinic
214 East Fifth South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
'MytdUUL^-

38336
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BRIAN M. BARNARD
USB #0215
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC
Former Attorney for FRANK A. RANDAZZO
Defendant
214 East Fifth South
Salt Lake City, Utah
84111-3204
Telephone: (801) 328-9532 or 328-9532
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
STATE OF UTAH

SHIRLEY N. RANDAZZO,
Plaintiff,
vs.

SALT LAKE COUNTY

MOTION TO VACATE
ORDER OP SANCTIONS
and
OBJECTION TO ORDER
Civil No. 88-4904130 DA

FRANK A. RANDAZZO,
Defendant.

(Hon, M. MURPHY)

BRIAN M. BARNARD former counsel for the defendant in
the above captioned matter objects and moves this Court as
followst

1. This Court ruled on September 13, 1989 that
sanctions should be imposed upon former counsel for the
defendant.
2.

Counsel for the plaintiff served upon former

counsel for the defendant a copy of the proposed order based
upon the hearing of September 13, 1989.

3.

The Court ruled and imposed sanctions without

notice to former counsel.
4. The Court ruled and imposed sanctions without
allowing former counsel to present evidence or explain his
conduct.
5. The Court ruled and imposed sanctions based on
false or incomplete information.
6.

This objection and motion are supported by the

Affidavit of Brian H. Barnard dated September 18, 1989 filed
herewith.
7.

Former counsel for the defendant gave notice to

defendant of the Court's ruling of August 2, 1989 in a
cimaly and appropriate manner.

Former counsel for the

defendant gave notice to defendant of his obligations based
upon the Court's ruling in a timely and appropriate manner.
8.

Entering an order of sanctions against former

counsel, without notice and without an opportunity to be
heard constitutes a deprivation of property and liberty
without due process.

WHEREFORE, Brian M. Barnard objects to the proposed
order and imposition of sanctions against him and moves this
Court to vacate the oral ruling and not enter the proposed
order based upon that oral ruling.
DATED this 18th day of September, 1989.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy
of the foregoing OBJECTION & MOTION TO VACATE tot
ANN L. WASSERMANN Attorney for Plaintiff
426 South 500 East
Sale Lake City. Utah
84102
FRANK RANDAZZO Defendant Pro Se
6458 South 1140 Vest
Murray, Utah
84123
postage prepaid in the United States Postal Service on the
18th day of SEPTEMBER, 1989.

BRIAN M. BARNARD
USB I 0215
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC
Former Attorney for FRANK A, RANDAZZO
Defendant
214 East Fifth South
Salt Lake City, Utah
84111
Phonei (801) 328-9532
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
STATE OF UTAH

SHIRLEY N. RANDAZZO,

SALT LAKE COUNTY

AFFIDAVIT OF
BRIAN M, BARNARD

Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil No. 88-4904130 DA

FRANK A. RANDAZZO,
(Hon. M. MURPHY)
Defendant.

STATE OF UTAH
SS.
SALT LAKE COUNTY
BRIAN M. BARNARD having been duly sworn upon oath
deposes and states as followss

1.

I am the former counsel for the defendant in the

above captioned matter.

I am an attorney admitted to

practice in this Court.

r

PLAINTIFF
FYUIRIT

2.

During the afternoon of August 2, 1989, after the

oral ruling by the Court in this' action, I had a telephone
conversation with the defendant Frank Randazzo.

In that

conversation 1 read him my notes from the court's ruling.
3.

In that phone conversation, I specifically told him

that he was obligated to bring current the indebtedness to
the Cyprus Credit Union and that he had Co make the payment
due in late August,
4.

On August 7, 1989, I received a letter from plain-

tiff's counsel (a copy is attached).

On that date I mailed

a copy of that letter to the defendant Frank Randazzo at
6458 South 1140 West, Murray, Utah 84123.
rh.it copy war. a note to call me.

Included with

The defendant did not call

me in rcponsc* to that note.
5.

On or about August 18, 1989, Z received proposed

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Decree of
Divorce in this matter from plaintiff's counsel.

On August

19, 1989 I mailed a copy of those pleadings to the defendant
Frank Randazzo at 6458 South 1140 West, Murray, Utah 84123.
Included with that copy was a note to review the documents
and to call me.

Defendant did not call me in response to

that note.
6.

After the oral ruling and decision in this matter,

I ordered a transcript of that ruling.

I received that from

this Court's stenographic reporter after August 18, 1989.

on August Z3, 1989, shortly after receipt, I mailed a copy
of that transcript: to the defendant at his Murray address.
7.

On or about September 1, 1989, I received an

Affidavit of Plaintiff, a Motion for Contempt and a Notice
of Hearing in this matter from plaintiff's counsel.

On

September 1, 1989 I mailed a copy of those pleadings to the
defendant Frank Randazzo at his Murray address.

Included

with those copies was a note to review the documents and to
call me.
8.

On or about September 5, 1989 I received a phone

call from the defendant in which he acknowledged receipt of
the Motion for Contempt and accompanying documents. He
complained to me in that conversation about his wife's
continuing refusal to deliver his property to him, her
recently caking his horse to a pasture three hundred (300)
miles away, etc.

In that conversation I told him that my

office could no longer represent him.
9.

In that September 5, 1989 conversation, I told him

that he had to appear on September 13, 1989 for the hearing.
10.

On September 5, 1989 I prepared a withdrawal of

counsel and mailed it to the defendant at 6458 South 1140
West, Murray, Utah 84123.

Included in that withdrawal is a

notice of the hearing on September 13, 1989.

11.

Since May 2, 1989 the only home address that I

have had for the defendant is 6458 South 1140 West, Murray,
Utah 84123.
12.

Each of the documents as set forth above mailed to

the defendant was sent to the defendant's Murray address
with sufficient postage. None of the documents mailed as
set forth above have been returned to me by the Postal
Service.
DATED this 18th day of September, 1989.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy
of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF BRIAN H, BARNARD to-.
ANN L. WASSERMANN
Attorney for Plaintiff
426 South 500 East
Salt Lake City, Utah

84102

FRANK RANDAZZO
Defendant Pro Se
6458 South 1140 West
Murray, Utah
84123
postage prepaid in the United States Postal Service on the
18th day of SEPTEMBER, 1989.
1ITAU LEGAL CLINIC

Former Attorney for Defendant
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August 7* 1989
HAND DELIVERED

Mr. Brian M. Barnard* Esq.
Utah Legal Clinic
214 East Fifth South
Salt Lake City, Utah 04111
Ret

Randazzo v. Randazzo

Dear Briant
I have obtained the following information from the
Credit Union regarding the Randazzo loan; aa you will ace, it is
necessary for Mr. Randazzo to act very quickly in this matter.
First* with respect to the motorcycle insurance* the
insurance is duo immediately, and the policy is subject to
cancellation at any time. The insurance agent who has been
handling the matter is Ray Horrocks* with Farmers Insurance. The
premium duo ia $117.00* which will extend tho policy. I believe*
for three months. Tho phono number for the Regional Office of
Farmers Insurance is (208) 233-3571.
I also obtained information regarding bringing the loan
current* as well an with regard to making provision for future
payments. As of August 7* 1989* a payment of $724.00 would bo
required to bring the account current. Of that amount* $237*67
represents accrued interest. Thus* payment in full of the amount
would reduce tho principal owing by $486.00. You should note
that another payment is due on the 28th of the month* which will
be required in addition to payment of the $724.00. In terms of
setting up a mechanism for future payments* it seems to mo that
the simplest method would bo to credit Prank for a reduction in
principal of $486.00 (this assumes payment of the $724*00 prior
to August 28). If that amount is subtracted from $8*034.00 (tho
amount Judge Murphy has allocated to Prank)* his portion of the
outstanding principal would be $7,548*00* In turn* the total balance

EXHIBIT

Mr. Brian M. Barnard* Esq,
August 7, 1989
Page 2

outstanding on the loan would be $3,646.00 ($9*132*00 minus
$486.00). Frank*s proportion of that loan balance would be 87
percent* I would suggest that he simply pay to Shirley 87
percent of the monthly payment due ($362.00,) or $316.00 per
month. Those payments would be made for the life of the loan.
If my reasoning is not correct« please let me know at
once. I would like to get the final divorce documents put
together immediately, but want to make sure that we are clear on
this matter.
Very)truly yours(

ALW/ams
cat
359

Shirley Randazzo

BRIAN M. BARNARD
USB § 0215
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC
Former Attorney for FRANK A. RANDAZZO
Defendant
214 East Fifth South
Salt Lake City, Utah
84111
Phone: (801) 328-9532
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY

SHIRLEY N. RANDAZZO,

REQUEST FOR HEARING

Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil No. 88-4904130 DA

FRANK A. RANDAZZO,
(Hon. M. MURPHY)
Defendant.

BRIAN M. BARNARD, former counsel for the defendant in
the above captioned matter hereby requests this court to set
for hearing the motion brought by Brian M. Barnard to vacate
the order of sanctions entered against him and to set for
hearing Brian M. Barnard's objection to the proposed order
based on the hearing of September 13, 1989.
DATED this 'jfetf-— day of September, 1989.
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC

BRIAN v{.
Attorney

vtimxpr
PLAINTIFF'S
EXHIBIT
•« _. **

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
X hereby certify that X mailed a true and correct copy
of the foregoing REQUEST FOR HEARING tot
ANN L. WASSERMANN
Attorney for Plaintiff
426 South 500 East
Salt Lake City, Utah

84102

FRANK RANDAZZO
Defendant Pro Se
6458 South 1140 West
Murray, Utah 84123
postage prepaid in the United States Postal Service on the
?/^

day of SEPTEMBER, 1989.

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW,
JUDGMENT AND ORDER

BRIAN M. BARNARD,
Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. 900903227 CV

ANN L. WASSERMAN,
SHIRLEY RANDAZZO,
and
THE HON. MICHAEL MURPHY,
Judge of the Third District
Court in and for Salt Lake
County, State of Utah,

Judge Pat B. Brian

Defendants.
The above-captioned matter having come before the Court
on Friday, March 22, 1991 at the hour of 8:30 a.m. for
consideration of plaintiff's and defendant, Judge Murphy's crossmotions for Summary Judgment and plaintiff's motion for Judgment
On The Pleadings.

Plaintiff appeared pro se.

Murphy, was represented by Carlie Christensen.

Defendant Judge
Defendant

Randazzo, did not appear in person, nor through her counsel of
record, Ann Wasserman, nor has the defendant Randazzo filed any
response to plaintiff's motions.

The Court having heard and

considered the arguments of counsel and having reviewed the
legal authorities submitted by the parties, and now being fully

i&W&sii
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advised in the premises, makes the following Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law, and Order:
FINDINGS OF FACT:
1.

This action was brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section
1983 challenging the constitutionality of a state court
order issued by the Honorable Michael R. Murphy in the
the case of Randazzo v. Randazzo, D-88-4130, a divorce
proceeding filed in the Thrid Judicial District Court,
State of Utah.

2.

Plaintiff, Brian Barnard is an attorney admitted to
practice law in the State of Utah and formerly counsel
for Frank Randazzo, the defendant in the divorce
proceeding in Thrid District Court.

3.

Defendant, Ann Wasserman is also an attorney admitted to
practice law in Utah and counsel for Shirley Randazzo,
the plaintiff in the divorce proceeding in Third
District Court.

4.

Defendant, the Honorable Michael R. Murphy is a duly
appointed and elected judge of the Third Judicial
District Court and presided over the Randazzo case.

5.

On September 13, 1989, at aproximately 3:00 p.m., Judge
Murphy held a hearing on a Motion for a Finding of
Contempt filed by Shirley Randazzo.

Ms. Randazzo's

BARNARD V WASSERMAN
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motion sought to find Frank Randazzo in contempt for
his failure to comply with the terms of the divorce
decree and specifically, his failure to make payments
to Ms. Randazzo's credit union to keep a loan obligation
current.

Ms. Randazzo and her counsel, Ann Wasserman

were both present at the hearing.
6.

At 4:35 p.m., approximately an hour and a half after the
hearing began, Mr. Randazzo arrived without counsel.
Judge Murphy noted for the record that Mr. Barnard had
previously withdrawn as counsel from the case.

7.

After reviewing the pleadings on file, the proffer of
Ms. Randazzo7s counsel and the representations of Mr.
Randazzo, Judge Murphy found that Mr. Randazzo did not
receive notice of the hearing; that his former counsel,
Mr. Barnard did not give Mr. Randazzo timely notice of
the details of the Court's decision as announced on
August 2, 1989; and that Mr. Barnard did not forward
copies of the proposed Findings of Fact and Divorce
Decree to Mr. Randazzo.

8.

Based upon the foregoing, Judge Murphy concluded that
Mr. Randazzo was not in contempt of court and ordered
that the divorce decree be amended to require Mr.
Randazzo to reimburse Ms. Randazzo for all monies
expended by her as a result of Mr. Randazzo's failure

WASSERMAN
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to keep the credit union loan current, and that Mr.
Randazzo pay to Ms, Randazzo the sum of $430.00 for
attorney,s fees incurred by her in connection with the
contempt proceeding.

Judge Murphy also ordered that

Mr. Randazzo not pay any money to his former counsel
until the award of attorneys7 fees was paid to Ms.
Randazzo7s counsel and that money paid by Mr. Randazzo
to Ms. Randazzo7s counsel be credited, dollar for
dollar against Mr. Randazzo7s obligation to Mr.
Barnard.
On September 15, 1989, Ms. Randazzo7s counsel mailed a
copy of the proposed order to Mr. Randazzo and Mr.
Barnard.
On or about September 18, 1989, Mr. Barnard filed a
"Motion to Vacate Order of Sanctions and Objection to
Order" and his own affidavit in support of the motion.
On September 20, 1989, Mr. Barnard filed a request for
a hearing.
On October 12, 1989, Judge Murphy signed the proposed
order and directed his clerk, Marlene Bills, to hold
the order pending resolution of Mr. Barnard7s
objections.
On November 14, 1989, Mr. Barnard appeared before Judge
Murphy as counsel for defendants in the matter of Ward
v. Butcher, Civil No. C88-4883, a matter unrelated to

MEMO DECISION
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the Randazzo case.

At that time, Ms. Bills advised Mr.

Barnard that Ms. Wasserman was not willing to stipulate
to the entry of an amended order in the Randazzo matter
and asked whether he wanted to schedule a hearing on
his objections.

Mr. Barnard advised Ms. Bills to file

the order and that he would "take care of it another
way".

Based upon Mr. Barnard's representations, Ms.

Bills issued a minute entry indicating that Mr. Barnard
did not intend to have a hearing on his objections and
that Judge Murphy's order of October 12, 1989 would be
filed.
13.

Approximately one week later, on November 21, 1989,
Judge Murphy held a scheduling conference in the matter
of Ward v. Butcher.

At that time, Judge Murphy

inquired of Mr. Barnard whether Judge Murphy was named
as a defendant in the matter of Barnard v. Wasserman
and if so, whether Judge Murphy could continue to
preside over the Ward case.

Mr. Barnard indicated that

unless there was a resolution to the Randazzo case, Mr.
Barnard would be compelled to file a lawsuit.
14.

Judge Murphy then swore his clerk, Marlene Bills,
and asked her to testify as to whether a hearing had
been scheduled in the Randazzo matter.
testified as follows:

Ms. Bills

WASSERMAN
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I told Mr. Barnard if Ann wasn't willing to amend
the findings and Order, and if he wanted to
schedule a hearing, that was fine. He indicated
to me, "Go ahead and file then, because I'll just
take care of it in Federal Court." After that, I
filed the signed Findings of Fact and Order, and
left it at that. I had been holding the papers
for — well, since the 12th, when they were
signed. And had been holding them and had not
filed them until that day.
Brian Barnard was then sworn and testified as follows:
The conversation that your clerk related to you
is correct, except for one particular, and that
is I didn't make any reference to Federal Court
at all. I said, "Go ahead and file it. I'll
take care of it in another way."
I also told her that I would take an S.O.B.. pill
and go after Ann Wasserman, because I didn't like
the way Ann Wasserman had treated me. And she
commented in a joking manner, back to me.
Based upon Mr. Barnard's representations, Judge Murphy
disqualified himself from further proceedings in the
Ward matter.
On February 9, 1990, plaintiff filed suit against Judge
Murphy in the United States District Court for the
District of Utah challenging the constitutionality of
the state court order issued by Judge Murphy in the
Randazzo case.
On May 4, 1990, the Hon. Clarence Brimmer, the Chief
Judge of the U.S. District Court for the District of
Wyoming, sitting by designation, ordered that
plaintiff's claims be dismissed for lack of subject

BARNARD V WASSERMAN
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matter jurisidiction.

Judge Brimmer also found that

the relief sought by plaintiff was barred by the
doctrine of judicial immunity.
19o

On May 31, 1990, plaintiff filed this action in the
Third District Court against the same parties and
based upon the same legal theories as the federal
action which he filed.

On July 17, 1990, Judge Murphy

accepted service of the summons and complaint.
20.

Defendant Shirley Randazzo has not filed any
responsive pleadings to plaintiff's motions.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

1.

That this action was brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
Section 1983 challenging the constitutionality of a
state court order issued by the Honorable Michael R.
Murphy in the case of Randazzo v. Randazzo, D-88-413 0,
a divorce proceeding filed in the Third Judicial
District Court, State of Utah.

That the plaintiff in

this action is seeking attorneys7 fees and costs
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1988.
2.

That judges are immune from suit under 42 U.S.C. Section
1983 for acts committed within their judicial capacity.

3.

That a judge has acted in his judicial capacity if he
has not acted in the clear absence of all jurisdicition

BARNARD V WASSERMAN
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and if the act is a judicial one.

Stump v. Sparkman,

435 U.S. 34, reh. den., 436 U.S. 951 (1978).
4.

That an act is a judicial act if it is a function
normally performed by a judge and the parties dealt
with the judge in his official capacity.

Martinez v.

Winner, 771 F.2d 424, 434 (10th Cir. 1985)
5.

That Judge Murphy's conduct consisted solely of
conducting a hearing and signing and entering an order.
That such conduct is consistent with the conduct
normally engaged in by judges of the District Court.

6.

That the plaintiff's dealings with Judge Murphy were
limited exclusively to actions performed by Judge
Murphy in his judicial capacity.

That plaintiff had

no extra-judicial contact with Judge Murphy or dealt
with the District Court in any other capacity than
as an attorney.

That the conduct in question

consisted solely of normal judicial functions in a case
pending before Judge Murphy and arose from dealings with
the judge in his official capacity.
7.

That Judge Murphy's actions were judicial acts.

Stump

v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 34, reh. den., 436 U.S. 951
(1978); Martinez v. Winner, 771 F.2d 424, 434 (10th
Cir. 1985).
8.

That the test for determining the application of the

WASSERMAN
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doctrine of judicial immunity is whether there is a
clear absence of all jurisdiction over the subject
matter and not whether the judge committed procedural
errors.

Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978);

Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335 (1872).
That the District Court has subject matter jurisdiction
over contempt proceedings involving attorneys who
willfully neglect or violate their duty.

Utah Code

Ann. Sections 78-3-4 and 78-32-1.
That Judge Murphy had subject matter jurisdiction over
the contempt proceedings against plaintiff for his
alleged neglect in failing to inform his client of his
responsibilities under the divorce decree.
That any defects in the contempt procedures employed by
Judge Murphy in the Randazzo case will not support a
conclusion that there was a clear absence of all
jurisdiction.

Stump v Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978) ;

Rolleston v. Eldriqe. 848 F.2d 163 (11th Cir. 1988);
and Williams v. Sepe. 487 F.2d 913 (5th Cir. 1973).
That Judge Murphy was acting in his judicial capacity
at the time of the alleged wrongful conduct, that all
of his actions were judicial ones and that he did not
act in the clear absence of all jurisdiction.
That judicial immunity is not a bar to prospective

. WASSERMAN
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injunctive relief against a judicial officer.

Pulliam

v, Allen, 466 U.S. 522 (1984).
That plaintiff's request for injunctive and declaratory
relief in the present case is simply an attempt to
obtain the review and reversal of a state court order.
Navajo Nation v. District Court for Utah County, 624
F. Supp. 130 (D. Utah, 1985).
That plaintiff's request for injunctive and declaratory
relief is clearly retroactive and not prospective.
Barnard v. Murphy, Civil No. 89-C-1042-B, Order on
Motions for Summary Judgment (D. Utah, 1990).
That plaintiff's request for injunctive and declaratory
relief does not fall within the exceptional language
contained in Pulliam.
That plaintiff's claims are therefore barred by the
doctrine of judicial immunity.
That the fundamental requirement of due process of law
is the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time
and in a meaningful manner.

Armstrong v. Manzo, 3 80

U.S. 545, 552 (1965).
That the presumption against a claimed waiver of
constitutional rights can be overcome upon a showing of
a valid waiver.

Pitts v. Board of Education of U.S.D.

305, Salina, Kansas, 869 F.2d 555, 557 (10th Cir.
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1989) ; Johnnson v. U.S. Department of Agriculture, 734
F.2d 774, 784 (11th Cir. 1984).
That the determination as to whether a valid waiver
exists depends upon whether there was an intentional
abandonment or relinquishment of a known right.
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938); Edwards
v. Arizona. 451 U.S. 477, 482 (1981).
That a determination as to whether there was an
intentional abandonment or relinquishment of a known
right, in turn, depends upon whether the party
understood his rights, and whether he knowingly and
voluntarily waived them.

Ostlund v. Bob, 825 F.2d

1371, 1373 (9th Cir. 1987); Sassower v. Sheriff of
Westchester Co.. 824 F.2d 184, 190 (2nd Cir. 1987).
That plaintiff understood that he had the right to be
heard inasmuch as he filed a written request for a
hearing.
That plaintiff voluntarily waived that right when he
advised Judge Murphy's clerk to enter the order and
informed her that he would "take care of it in another
way".
That plaintiff knowingly waived that right inasmuch as
plaintiff is an attorney who practices extensively in
the area of civil rights litigation, that he is
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informed about individual constitutional rights and the
consequences of waiving those rights, and that he is
retained by others to offer his professional judgment
on the exercise and waiver of those rights.
That plaintiff's direction to Judge Murphy*s clerk to
enter the order and his statement that he would "take
care of it in another way" were made with the
understanding and knowledge that he would not recieve a
hearing prior to the entry of the order.
That once a state has provided a procedure for
remedying a perceived wrong, a civil rights complainant
is obligated to avail himself of those remedies, and if
the complainant's due process rights are waived.
Weinrauch v. Park City, 751 F.2d 357, 360 (10th Cir.
1984); Riqgins v. Board of Regents of the University
of Nebraska, 790 F.2d 707, 712 (8th Cir. 1986); and
Jacobus v. Heydiner, 643 F.Supp. 550 (S.D.W.Va. 1986).
That plaintiff was afforded the opportunity to be heard
on his objections to the order and to remedy the
perceived wrong, that plaintiff was obligated to avail
himself of that remedy, and that plaintiffs decision
not to utilize the procedure offered constitutes a
waiver of plaintiffs due process rights.
That where a state can feasibly provide a pre-
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deprivation hearing before taking a constitutionally
protected property or liberty interest, it generally
must do so regardless of the adequacy of the postdeprivation remedy.

Zinermon v. Burch,

U.S.

,

110 S.Ct. 975 (1990).
That plaintiff was not deprived of a constitutionally
protected interest by the signing of Judge Murphy's
October 12 t 1989 order.
That it was the entry of Judge Murphy's order which
gave rise to the alleged deprivation of plaintiff's
property and liberty interests.
That until Judge Murphy entered the order, its contents
were not a matter of public record nor was Shirley
Randazzo, the plaintiff in the Third District Court
divorce proceeding, able to enforce it.
That plaintiff was not deprived of any property
interest or liberty interest in his name and reputation
until the order was entered.
That plaintiff was afforded the opportunity to be heard
on his objections prior to the entry of Judge Murphy's
order.
That it was plaintiff's own direction to Judge Murphy's
clerk to enter Judge Murphy's order, that resulted in
its entry without further hearing.

BARNARD V WASSERMAN
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That plaintiff did not suffer any deprivation of a
constitutionally protected interest until Judge Murphy
entered his order; that plaintiff had the opportunity,
prior to the entry of that order, to be heard on his
objections; that said opportunity constituted a predeprivation remedy consistent with Zinermon and was
constitutionally sufficient and that plaintiff waived
that opportunity.

ORDER

1.

Plaintiff's motion for Summary Judgment against
defendant Shirley Randazzo is granted.

The motion is

unopposed.
2o

Defendants' motion for Summary Judgment against
plaintiff is granted on the doctrines of Judicial
Immunity, Res Judicata and Waiver.

3.

All other pending motions are denied as moot.

£

Dated this O

day of April, 1991.

PAT B. BRIAN
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

BRIAN M. BARNARD
USB #0215
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC
Attorneys for Plaintiff
214 East Fifth South
Salt Lake City, Utah
84111-3204
Phone: (801) 328-9531 or 328-9532
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY

STATE OF UTAH

BRIAN M. BARNARD,
Civil No. C-90-0903227 C

Plaintiff,
vs.
;
ANN L. WASSERMANN,
SHIRLEY RANDAZZO,
and
THE HON. MICHAEL MURPHY,
Judge of the Third District
Court in and for Salt Lake
County, State of Utah,

ORDER DISMISSING
COMPLAINT

j
(Judge Pat Brian)

Defendants.

THE ABOVE MATTER having come before the Court on March
16, 1992, at 1:00 p.m., the Hon. Pat Brian, judge presiding,
plaintiff appearing in person and by and through counsel,
defendant Randazzo appearing through her counsel of record,
Ann Wassermann, defendant Murphy not appearing personally nor
through his counsel, the Court having heard the arguments of
the parties and having reviewed the file and the pleadings
therein, upon the stipulation of the parties the court having
considered the affirmative defense of the defendant Randazzo

that plaintiff's complaint fails to state a cause of action
upon which relief may be granted as against Randazzo, based
thereon and upon the motion of defendant and for good cause
appearing:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:
The complaint as against defendant Shirley Randazzo,
should be and hereby is dismissed.
DATED this

„ x ^ d a y of APRIL, 1992.
BY THE COURT:

A-' /

PAT BRIAN,
JUDGE
Third District Court

2

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on the 16th day of APRIL, 1992
Plaintiff caused to be mailed a copy of the above and
foregoing pleading ORDER OF DISMISSAL to:
ANN WASSERMANN
Attorney for Defendant Randazzo
426 South 5th East
Salt Lake City, Utah
84102
COLIN WINCHESTER
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT MURPHY
230 South 5th East

#300

Salt Lake City, Utah
84102
counsel for opposing parties, postage prepaid in the United
States Postal Service.
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC
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BRIAN M. BARNARD
USB # 0215
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC
Attorneys for Plaintiff
214 East Fifth South
Salt Lake City, Utah
84111-3204
Phone: (801) 328-9531 or 328-9532
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY

STATE OF UTAH

BRIAN M. BARNARD,
Plaintiff,

Civil No. C-90-0903227 CV

vs.

NOTICE OF APPEAL

ANN L. WASSERMANN,
SHIRLEY RANDAZZO,
and
THE HON. MICHAEL MURPHY,
Judge of the Third District
Court in and for Salt Lake
County, State of Utah,

:
(Judge Pat Brian)
:
:

Defendants.

The plaintiff, by and through counsel, hereby gives
notice of his appeal to the Utah Supreme Court of the
decision of this court (April 5, 1991) dismissing this
action as against the defendant The Hon. Michael Murphy and
the order (April 28, 1992) dismissing this action as against

the defendant Shirley Randazzo.
DATED this 6th day of MAY, 1992.
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC
Attorney for Plaintiff

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on the 6th day of MAY, 1992
Plaintiff caused to be mailed a copy of the above and
foregoing pleading NOTICE OF APPEAL to:
ANN WASSERMAN
Attorney for Defendant Randazzo
426 South 5th East
Salt Lake City, Utah
84102
CARLIE CHRISTENSEN
and
COLIN WINCHESTER
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT MURPHY
230 South 5th East
Salt Lake City, Utah

#300
84102

counsel for opposing parties, postage prepaid in the United
States Postal Service.
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC
Attorney for Plaintiff
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH
BRIAN M. BARNARD,
Plaintiff,
vs.

NO. 89-C-1042-B

ANN L. WASSERMANN,
SHIRLEY RANDAZZO, and
THE HON. MICHAEL MURPHY,
Judge of the Third District
Court in and for Salt Lake
County, State of Utah,

MAY - S 1990 ^
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE
OF THE COURTS

Defendants.

ORDER ON MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
This matter comes before the Court on the motion for judgment
on the pleadings of the plaintiff and on the motions for summary
judgment of defendants Ann L. Wasserman and Michael Murphy.

The

Court, having reviewed the pleadings, having heard the arguments
of counsel, and being fully advised in the premises, now FINDS and
ORDERS as follows:
Background
Plaintiff Brian M. Barnard is an attorney who represented
Frank Randazzo in a divorce action tried before the defendant,
Michael Murphy, Judge of the Third District Court in and for Salt
Lake County.

The defendant, Ann Wassermann, is an attorney who

represented Shirley Randazzo in the divorce action.

Shirley

Randazzo is also named as a defendant in this action, and the Court
has entered default against her for her failure to answer the
complaint.
Frank Randazzo was required to make certain payments to
Shirley Randazzo pursuant to the divorce decree.

Those payments

were not made, and Shirley Randazzo moved to hold Frank Randazzo
in contempt.

Neither Frank Randazzo nor Barnard appeared at the

time set for the hearing on the motion September 13, 1989.
court noted that Barnard had withdrawn as counsel

The

for Frank

Randazzo September 6, 1989, giving notice of that withdrawal to
Randazzo, to the Court, and to Wasserman. Randazzo appeared at the
hearing pro se an hour and thirty-five minutes late. Upon hearing
his side of the story, Judge Murphy ordered Randazzo to pay any
attorney fees due Barnard to Wasserman.1
*

The court ordered Wasserman to draw up an order reflecting its

THE COURT: Let me tell you what you are going
to do. Before you pay Mr. Barnard one dime
more, you will pay to Ms. Wasserman for her
fees in regard to this hearing $43 0, which will
be, in my mind, — listen to me, Mr. Randazzo - a direct credit for the amounts that you owe
Mr. Barnard.
Randazzo v. Randazzo, No. 88-4904130DA, Sept. 13, 1989 transcript
at 29.
2

decision, which Wasserman did.

She mailed a copy of the Order to

Barnard, and he filed his motion to vacate the sanctions and
objections to the order, along with an affidavit and a request for
a hearing, on September 20, 1989.

On November 21, 1989, at a

hearing in an unrelated matter in which Barnard represented one of
the parties, Judge Murphy inquired of Barnard whether he intended
to file suit against him, "because if I'm a party to a lawsuit like
that I donft see how I can sit on this case..." Ward v. Butcher,
No. C 88-4483, Nov. 21, 1989, transcript at 2.

Judge Murphy's

clerk was sworn and testified that she had called Barnard to ask
whether he wanted her to schedule a hearing on his objections. He
indicated to her that he did not, so she filed the Order imposing
sanctions, which she had been holding at Judge Murphy's direction.
Id. at 8.

Barnard was then sworn and testified that he had told

the clerk to "go ahead and file" the Order, because he intended to
either file a Writ of Mandamus in state court or file an action in
federal court.

Id. at 9.

The Order imposing sanctions upon Barnard was filed in the
Third Judicial District Court November 14, 1989.

On November 22,

1989, Barnard filed the complaint in this action, alleging that
defendants had deprived him of his constitutional rights and

3

seeking damages and

injunctive and declaratory

relief.

The

complaint alleges that Judge Murphy, acting under color of state
law, deprived Barnard of his property and liberty interests without
due process of law, and that Wasserman acted in concert with him.
Barnard seeks judgment declaring the Order to be null and void and
unenforceable.

He further seeks damages from Wasserman, and

attorney fees and costs against all defendants.
Barnard now moves for judgment on the pleadings, and both
Murphy and Wasserman have moved for summary judgment.

Jurisdiction
This Court must first address the threshold question whether
it has jurisdiction in this case. The Tenth Circuit has held that
review of state court judgments in judicial proceedings may only
be had in the United States Supreme Court. Van Sickle v. Holloway,
791 F.2d 1431, 1436 (10th Cir. 1986).

"Federal district courts do

not have jurisdiction 'over challenges to state-court decisions in
particular cases arising out of judicial proceedings even if those
challenges

allege

unconstitutional."'

that

the

state

court's

action

was

Id. (quoting District of Columbia Court of

Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 486 (1983)).

4

Defendants argue that Barnard's § 1983 action is in fact a
challenge to a state court proceeding, and that this Court is
therefore without jurisdiction to hear it. They point to the fact
that part of the remedy sought by the plaintiff is declaratory or
injunctive relief voiding the Order entered in the Third Judicial
District Court of Utah.
Barnard contends this action is not an attempt to obtain
review of a state court decision in federal court. He argues that
he is only challenging the procedure by which the court deprived
him of his constitutional rights; he does not seek review of the
merits of that decision.

Therefore, Barnard reasons, this case

does not fall under the prohibition of Van Sickle and Feldman.
Barnard relies on Razatos v. Colorado Supreme Court, 746 F.2d 1429
(10th Cir. 1984), cert, denied, 471 U.S. 1016 (1985), to support
his argument.

In that case, the Tenth Circuit had before it a §

1983 action in which an attorney sought judgment declaring that
the Colorado procedure for disciplining attorneys violated the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Id. at 143 0.

The

court held that it did have jurisdiction to hear that case because
it did not involve an attorney's challenge to particular discipline
imposed upon him, but a "generalized constitutional attack on the

5

state's rules and regulations governing discipline." Id. at 1432.
The court relied on Feldman to make the distinction, holding that
"in the latter kind of case, the district court is not required to
review a state court judicial decision but rather to assess the
validity of a rule promulgated in a non-judicial proceeding." Id.
Barnard's interpretation of the Razatos holding does not
withstand scrutiny.

The court in that case distinguished between

rule-making and judicial proceedings. The law simply will not fit
Barnard's attempt to distinguish between the merits and procedure
within a judicial proceeding. The holdings of both Razatos and Van
Sickle are clear: a federal district court is without jurisdiction
to review a state court judicial decision. The Order which is the
source of Barnard's complaint is just such a judicial decision, and
this Court therefore does not have jurisdiction to hear this case.

Judicial Immunity
Although

we

need

proceed

no

further,

the

Court

will

nevertheless address the issue of judicial immunity. The value to
the courts of being free from harassment by dissatisfied litigants
far outweighs the danger that some wrongs may go unredressed.
Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978).

6

For that reason, "a judge

is entitled to judicial immunity if he has not acted in clear
absence of all jurisdiction and if the act was a judicial one."
Martinez v. Winner, 771 F.2d 424, 434 (10th Cir. 1985).
Barnard does not argue that Judge Murphy was not acting in his
judicial capacity.

Instead, he cites Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S.

522 (1984) , for the proposition that judicial immunity is not a bar
to an action for injunctive relief.
the law.

Barnard again misinterprets

In Pulliam, the plaintiff sought to enjoin a state

Magistrate from requiring bond for a nonincarcerable offense. The
United States District Court for the District of Utah has already
rejected the application of Pulliam to an action for an injunction
which sought retroactive, rather than prospective, relief. Navajo
Nation v. District Court for Utah County, 624 F.Supp. 130, 137
(D.Utah 1985). The relief sought by Barnard is clearly retroactive
and not prospective, and is therefore barred by judicial immunity.

Wasserman asserts, incorrectly, that the immunity of her codefendant extends to the action against her. The Tenth Circuit has
held that "the immunity of a state official will not necessarily
protect a private individual alleged to have conspired with him."
Shaffer v. Cook, 634 F.2d 1259, 1260 (10th Cir. 1980).

7

However,

Barnard has alleged no facts sufficient to establish the existence
of a conspiracy between Wasserman and Murphy.

n

[L]awyers do not

act under color of state law solely by engaging

in private

litigation on behalf of their clients." Id. at 1261 (quoting Brown
v. Chaffee, 612 F.2d 497, 501 (10th Cir. 1979)).

In order to go

forward in the action against her, Barnard must show that Wasserman
reached an understanding with Murphy to deprive Barnard of his
constitutional rights, or that she was a willful participant in a
joint activity with Murphy.
152 (1970) .

Adickes v. Kress S Co., 398 U.S. 144,

All Wasserman is alleged to have done is draft a

document embodying the Order of the court.

As the Tenth Circuit

fl

found in Shaffer,

[n]othing in the complaint indicates that the

court or the attorneys were acting outside the confines of the
neutral function of a judicial forum."

634 F.2d at 1260. Barnard

therefore has no cause of action against Wasserman.
THEREFORE, it is
ORDERED that plaintiff's complaint be DISMISSED for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction.

It is further

ORDERED that defendants' motion for sanctions be, and the same
hereby is, DENIED.
Dated this

Af

day of May ,..1990

CHIEF JUDGE,
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
8
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BRIAN BARNARD,
Plaintiff,

JUDGMENT IN A CIVIL CASE

V.

ANN WASSERMANN, ET AL.,
Defendants.

CASE NUMBER:

89-C-1042.B

£ ] Jury Verdict. This action came before the Court for a trial by jury. The issues have been tried and the jury has rendered
its verdict.
Q Decision by Court. This action came to trial or hearing before the Court. The issues have been tried or heard and a
decision has been rendered.

IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED

that the plaintiffs complaint is dismissed for lack of subject

matter jurisdiction. It is further ordered and adjudged that the defendants' motion for
sanctions is denied. Judgment is hereby entered in favor of the defendants and against
the plaintiff.

May 8, 1990
Date

(By) Deputy Clerk

f»r*r
2t 4 East Fifth South
SaltLake Gty,Vath 841U
(801)

$28-9531-S2SW32

Attotntj
Brian M. Barnard

October 4, 1989

The Hon. Michael R. Murphy, Judge
Third District Court
2A0 East A00 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

r>

N O V M 1989 „
ru
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Re:

Randazzo vs. Randazzo
"Civil Mo. 88-4904130 "DA

Dear Judge Murphy:
As you know I have made a motion to vacate the
sanctions and objected to the proposed order in this matter
based on the hearing of September 13, 1989.
Mr. Randazzo recently filed a bankruptcy (Case No.
89-05650-B).
Not withstanding that bankruptcy$ I am concerned about
the contents of the proposed order based on the hearing of
September 13, 1989. As you are aware9 the Findings in that
order were to the effect that I somehow was negligent in my
duties and responsibilities as his legal counsel. I don't
want those findings to remain unchallenged. As you are
aware 1 filed an affidavit in this matter dated September
18, 1989 setting forth my various contact with Mr. Randazzo
and that I timely conveyed to him information with regard to
court's rulings.
If that proposed order has not been entered and will
not be entered that resolves my concerns. If that order has
been entered, I feel compelled to take some action to
correct those Findings.
Would you please advise me as to whether that proposed
order has been entered or will be entered.
Thank you.

BMB/asw
cc:

Frank Randazzo
Donn Cassity, Esq.
Ann Wassermann, Esq.
PLAINTIFFS
EXHIBIT

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on the 31st day of AUGUST, 1992
Plaintiff caused to be mailed four (4) copies of the above
and foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT to:
ANN WASSERMANN
Attorney for Defendant Randazzo
426 South 5th East
Salt Lake City, Utah
84102
CARLIE CHRISTENSEN
and
COLIN WINCHESTER
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT MURPHY
230 South 5th East
Salt Lake City, Utah

#300
84102

counsel for opposing parties, postage prepaid in the United
States Postal Service.
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC
Attorney for Plaintiff
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